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I.

Introduction

*

B.A. Stanford University, J.D. Yale Law School. I served on the United States delegation to the International
Criminal Court Review Conference in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. Needless to say, the views expressed herein (and
any errors) are entirely my own and do not at all reflect the position of the United States government. All material
contained in here is available in the public record or derives from my notes of the Conference. I am indebted to
Diane Marie Amann, Meg DeGuzman, Judith Gardam, Susana SáCouto, and Jaya Ramji-Nogales and all of the
participants of the ―Creation of International Law‖ conference at the University of Oslo for their valuable comments
on this draft. My sincere thanks also go to Adam Birnbaum, Martin Guerbadot, and Nicola Gladitz for their expert
research assistance and to Mary Sexton for her valuable and tireless assistance gathering materials. Some of this
research is also featured in the series on the crime of aggression on IntLawGrrls,
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Crime%20of%20aggression%20series.
1
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The law struggles to contain violence, whether interpersonal or international. There is a
gendered component to many forms of violence: men commit most violent crimes,1 and men
initiate 2 and fight 3 most armed conflicts. This is not to say, of course, that women are not
responsible for violence as criminals,4 combatants,5 terrorists,6 or as aiders, abettors, enablers, or
supporters of various forms of violence. Indeed, over the years,7 a handful of women have been
1

The crime statistics for perpetrators of assault, serious assault, rape, and homicide compiled by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe illustrate this claim. See http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/DATABASE/STAT/30GE/07-CV/07-CV.asp.
See
also
similar
statistics
by
the
U.S.
Department
of
Justice,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus/previous/cvus38.pdf
2
Women serve as heads of state of about eighteen countries with Slovakia and Brazil recently joining this group.
Only seventy women from more than fifty countries have ever been elected or appointed to serve as president, prime
minister, or chancellor in recent history. See Equal Representation in Government, http://ergd.org/Premiers.htm;
Female World Leaders Currently in Power, http://www.filibustercartoons.com/charts_rest_female-leaders.php;
Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, Woman Elected or Appointed Heads of State and Government,
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Female_Leaders.htm. To date, about sixty-five women have served as
Minister of Defense. See Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, Female Ministers of Defense,
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Defence_ministers.htm. To be sure, nations led by women have resorted to
armed force. To provide just two examples, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher launched the Falklands War after
Argentina invaded the islands, and Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister during the 1971 wars that resulted in the
formation of Bangladesh. See Linda Malone, Woman and War, 12 WILLIAM & MARY J. OF WOMEN & LAW 297, 297
(2005-6) (―The historical prominence of Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, Condoleeza Rice or …
Madeleine Albright only accentuates how women with such power are few and far between.‖).
3
In the United States, about fourteen percent of military personnel are women. Women In Military Service For
America Memorial Foundation, Statistics on Women in the Military,
http://www.womensmemorial.org/PDFs/StatsonWIM.pdf. Women are underrepresented in the most senior ranks in
the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Only eleven percent of women in the British armed forces are
officers.
Ministry
of
Defense,
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/factsheets/womeninthearmedforces.htm. Even in the Israeli military, one of the
few that conscripts women, ―[w]omen account for less than 5% of the senior ranks.‖ CBS News, Women in the
Military — International (May 30, 2006), http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/military-international/. It was only in
1993 that Sheila Widnall was appointed U.S. Secretary of the Air Force—the first women to lead a branch of the
U.S. military. In most national militaries, women are excluded from certain combat functions by law. See generally
ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN: DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD WAR COURT–MARTIAL
(2005) (discussing the evolving roles of women in the military). The military is one sector of society that has
remained steadfastly impervious to demands for formal equality (although in light of the evolution of modern
warfare, this is an area where de facto equality is ahead of de jure equality). But see Navy Welcomes Women to
Serve in Submarines, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52990 (announcing February 2010 policy
change in the U.S. Navy allowing women to serve on submarines).
4
See supra note ___ (providing domestic statistics).
5
See generally MIRANDA ALISON, WOMEN AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: FEMALE COMBATANTS IN ETHNO-NATIONAL
CONFLICT (2009); Ernest Harsch, Women: Africa‘s Ignored Combatants, 19(3) AFRICA RENEWAL 17 (October
2005), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no3/193women.html; VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS
OR ACTORS? GENDER, ARMED CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE (Caroline N.O. Moser & Fiona Clark, eds.,
2010); Miranda Alison, Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 447
(2004) (challenging the idea that women are more peaceful then men with reference to liberatory nationalist
movements that may provide more space for women to participate as combatants than institutionalized armed
forces). For a profile and academic sources on girl soldiers, see Waltraud Queiser Morales, Girl Child Soldiers: The
Other Face of Sexual Exploitation and Gender Violence, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apjs/2008/1tri08/moraleseng.htm.
6
LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT: UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY, CONTAINING THE THREAT 120-128
(2006) (discussing female terrorists).
7
In the Nuremberg era, for example, Dr. Herte Oberheuser was a defendant in the so-called Doctor‘s Trial, which
was brought under Control Council Law No. 10 and focused on charges involving nonconsensual medical
experimentation and the euthanistic extermination of patients. See United States v. Brandt, et al., Indictment,
2
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prosecuted for the commission of international crimes.8 But, when a woman is maimed, battered
or killed, it is generally at the hands of a man, be it a family member, community member, or
combatant. The baseline vulnerability of women is enhanced in situations of armed conflict. 9
Even today, when violence against women is clearly unlawful under international humanitarian
law,10 such conduct is often employed as a deliberate ―tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill
fear in, disperse, and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.‖11
Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former U.N. peacekeeping commander, testified before the
Security Council in 2008 that ―[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a
soldier in an armed conflict.‖12 Indeed, in a series of landmark resolutions, the United Nations
Security Council recognized that violence against women in situations of armed conflict—a
phenomenon that has reached pandemic proportions and ―appalling levels of brutality‖—is an
issue of international peace and security within the Council‘s purview.13
Although international law historically overlooked gender-based violence,14 international
criminal law now penalizes many forms of violence against women when such acts rise to the
level of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.15 The most recent addition to this
pantheon of international offenses is the crime of aggression. 16 In June 2010, representatives

available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Indictments.pdf. See also Diane Marie Amann,
Portraits of Women at Nuremberg, in Proceedings of the Third International Humanitarian Law Dialogs
(forthcoming,
American
Society
of
International
Law),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1654732; Diane Marie Amann, Women at Nuremberg:
Defendants, Sept. 20, 2007, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/09/women-at-nuremberg-defendants.html; The
Trial of Ilse Koch, http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Dachauscrapbook/DachauTrials/IlseKoch.html (discussing
another Nuremberg-era female defendant).
8
More recently, women have been or are being prosecuted at three of the ad hoc tribunals. See Beth Van Schaack,
Not Our Sisters, INTLAWGRRLS, July 31, 2007, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/07/not-our-sisters.html
(describing female defendants before the modern ad hoc tribunals).
9
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-113 (1975).
10
See Theodore Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 A.J.I.L. 424 (1993); Rhonda
Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46
MCGILL L.J. 217 (2000).
11
S.C. Res. 1820 (2008).
12
Kate Snow, Christina Romano & Imaeyen Ibanga, Rice: Rape Shouldn‟t Be War Weapon U.N. Calls for End to Sexual
Violence Against Women During Conflicts, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/rice-rape-warweapon/story?id=5364523.
13
S.C. Res. 1820. Resolution 1820 followed on the heels of Resolution 1325—the most important Council
resolution on women, peace and security. Resolution 1820 focuses more concretely on sexual violence as an issue of
international security. See generally Sam Cook, Security Council Resolution 1820: On Militarism, Flashlights,
Raincoats, And Rooms With Doors—A Political Perspective On Where It Came From And What It Adds, 23 EMORY
INT‘L L. REV. 125 (2009). It was followed by Resolution 1888, which mandates that peacekeeping missions protect
women and girls from sexual violence and better integrate a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. S.C.
Res. 1888 (2009), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9753.doc.htm.
14
See generally Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 288 (2003).
15
See Navanethem Pillay, Protection Of The Health Of Women Through International Criminal Law: How Can
International Criminal Law Contribute To Efforts To Improve The Health Of Women?, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 15
(2008).
16
In Kampala, delegates adopted on the following definition of aggression:
―crime of aggression‖ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of
3

from the international community completed marathon negotiations over a definition of the
crime of aggression to be inserted in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC or the
Court).17 In so doing, they completed a task that the original drafters of the treaty were unable to
accomplish the first time around and with which the international community has been struggling
for decades. The negotiations surrounding the crime of aggression focused on two major issues:
a definition of the crime and a jurisdictional regime to enable its prosecution. The latter issue
turned on what role, if any, the Security Council would play in prosecuting the crime of
aggression in light of its central role in responding to threats to and breaches of the peace under
the U.N. Charter system. Both issues proved to be contentious, on their own and in their
interaction. In May and June of 2010, delegations from ICC states parties, as well as many
observer states and non-governmental organizations, converged in Kampala, Uganda, to
complete the negotiations.18 Those in attendance succeeded in adopting a definition of the crime
of aggression with several important understandings. Significant progress was made on the
jurisdictional regime, but delegates left the operationalization of the crime to a future decision of
the Assembly of States Parties to take place no sooner than 2017.19
This Article analyzes the outcome of the Kampala process with an eye toward the rarelyconsidered gender aspects of the crime of aggression on the assumption that rules that aim to
constrain violence should benefit women. In so doing, it discusses whether or not the provisions
adopted represent an advancement for women, and how feminist theory might interpret the new
regime.20 The insertion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute fills what many perceived
as a lacuna in international criminal law that has existed since the World War II era. Any impact
of the provisions will inevitably be limited by gaps and ambiguities in the definition of the crime
and the jurisdictional regime, which is premised on state consent and exempts non-party states
altogether.21 These compromises on definitional precision and jurisdictional comprehensiveness
were instrumental in achieving consensus in Kampala. On the hopeful side, the definition of
aggression enables the prosecution of a wider range of acts and actors that cause harm to women.
It also potentially makes actionable harm to women that may not rise to the level of war crimes
or crimes against humanity and that has historically been rendered juridically invisible by the
collateral damage euphemism. The option to grant amnesty for the crime of aggression also
suggests a unique utility when international negotiators must balance the competing imperatives
of peace and justice.
At the same time, indirect negative effects may flow from the interaction of the Court‘s
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf [herein after ―Resolution RC/Res.6‖].
17
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9 [hereinafter ―ICC
Statute‖].
18
The list of speakers on the first day of General Debate at the Review Conference provides examples of the range
of
delegations
in
attendance
in
Kampala.
See
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/GENERAL+DEBATE+_+Review+Conference.htm
19
See Articles 15bis(3), 15ter(3), Resolution RC/Res.6; Annex III, Understanding 3.
20
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836, 837 (1990) (advocating that
feminists ask ―the woman question‖ to ―expose how the substance of law may silently and without justification
submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded groups‖ and to ―identify the gender implications of rules
and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.‖).
21
See infra Part ___.
4

potential to prosecute the crime of aggression and the long-standing jus in bello, the body of
rules that governs how war is waged rather than evaluating why war is waged, which is the
purview of the jus ad bellum. By penalizing the resort to armed force, the threat of prosecution of
the crime of aggression may undermine incentives to comply with key doctrines within
international humanitarian law that serve to protect civilians and other vulnerable groups—
distinction and proportionality. It also remains to be seen whether the codification of the crime of
aggression will serve any deterrent purpose whatsoever when governmental leaders contemplate
using force offensively or defensively in their international relations. To the extent that the new
provisions exert a restraining effect, the expansive way in which the crime has been defined may
end up chilling those uses of force that are protective, that do not implicate exigent sovereign
threats, and that are more discretionary, such as uses of force employed pursuant to the nascent
doctrine of responsibility to protect. The existence of the crime on the books may thus result in
ex post prosecutions at the expense of ex ante efforts at preventing and repressing violence.22
Whether this over-deterrence argument should be raised on behalf of women, however, requires
an acceptance of the legitimacy, if not lawfulness, of humanitarian intervention with or without
Security Council approval. Raising concerns about chilling humanitarian intervention also
requires a coming to terms with a certain valorization of militarism and its inherent
masculinities—a perspective that is alien to much feminist thinking.23
The Court has yet to demonstrate that it can fulfill its current mandate to prosecute war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide—deemed ―the most serious crimes of
international concern.‖24 Operationalizing the crime of aggression without allocating additional
resources to enable the Court to prosecute this controversial, largely unprecedented, 25 and
qualitatively different crime may distract the Court from responding effectively to the ―atrocity
crimes‖ that now finally address gender-based violence more directly. Giving the Court the
power to prosecute the crime of aggression may also encourage the Court to focus on leaders in
capital cities rather than the warlords next door, whom victims more directly associate with
atrocities. It may be impossible to achieve meaningful justice for women absent the prosecution
of these direct perpetrators. Given the potential to reach top political leaders, the crime may be
also subject to abuse. The amendments approved in Kampala will eventually permit states parties
to refer each other to the ICC as alleged violators of the prohibition against aggression.26 Misuse
of this referral authority could render the Court little more than just another forum for states to
manipulate and exploit in order to advance their interests. Such an outcome would politicize and
22

Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J.
INT‘L L. 331, 333 (2009) (noting how international criminal law has emerged as an alternative to intervention).
23
See, e.g., SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING TOWARDS A POLITICS OF PEACE 141-159 (1995); id. at xviii-xx
(discussing potential for nonviolent action in the face of atrocities). But see infra note ___ (citing authorities that
challenge the link between feminism and pacifism).
24
Article 1, ICC Statute. See infra Part ___.
25
Despite the centrality of crimes against the peace in the post-WWII proceedings, none of the post-Cold War
international tribunals included the crime of aggression within its subject matter jurisdiction, even though the crime
was arguably relevant to the Yugoslavian, Sierra Leonean, and East Timorese contexts, at a minimum. Only the
Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal includes an aggression-like prohibition drawn from domestic law. See Iraqi High
Criminal Court Law, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. As a
pan-Arabist gesture, Article 14 renders the following crime prosecutable: ―The abuse of position and the pursuit of
policies that were about to lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in
accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958.‖ Id. Saddam Hussein was executed before any Kuwait-related
charges against him could either be lodged or adjudicated.
26
See Article 15bis, Resolution RC/Res.6.
5

de-legitimize the Court.
At this early stage in the life of the Court and in the absence of any concrete experience
investigating or prosecuting the new crime of aggression, these bases for criticism and praise are
inherently speculative. Applying a feminist perspective to the codification of the crime of
aggression yields no easy conclusions. Rather, reasoning through the central question of whether
enabling the prosecution of the crime of aggression by the ICC will be good for women produces
a dizzying spiral of dialectical reasoning. As a feminist, 27 I thus approach the crime with a
profound ambivalence.
II.

War is Bad for Women

It goes without saying that conflict conditions are almost uniformly bad for women and
harm women in particular gender-specific ways,28 although the precise manifestations of harm
may differ according to the particulars of history and culture.29 Civilian casualties in war have
grown exponentially over time30 driven by a multitude of factors: increases in the destructive
potential of military technology; the prevalence and intensification of air warfare; the
proliferation of small arms; the increase in non-international armed conflicts that are no longer
confined to formal battle lines but rather extend deeply into civilian communities; and the
concomitant prevalence of irregular and undisciplined fighters, who receive little training in the
law or practice of war and are not subject to a rigorous chain of command.31 The harrowing
statistics of civilian deaths in modern warfare merely hint at the suffering experienced by noncombatants in war. While women are harmed alongside men when civilians are the direct or
indirect targets of violence, women experience armed conflict and repression in ways that are
different from men.32 As Catharine A. MacKinnon has written, ―women are violated in ways
that men are not, or rarely are.‖33
27

Bartlett, supra note ___, at 833 (defining a feminist approach as one that adopts ―a self-consciously critical stance
toward the existing order with respect to the various ways it affects different women ‗as women.‘‖).
28
My goal here is not to engage in ―competitive vulnerability‖ by suggesting that women uniformly suffer more
than men in conflict, but to think about the impact of war on women as a distinct phenomenon of any armed conflict.
See Hilary Charlesworth, Are Women Peaceful? Reflections on the Role of Women in Peace-Building, 16 FEMINIST
LEGAL STUDIES 347, 358 (2008) (critiquing view that women suffer more in conflict and have more to gain with
peace). See also LAURA SHEPHERD, GENDER, VIOLENCE AND SECURITY 116 (2008) (arguing that the claim that
women suffer in war more than men is both counter-productive and empirically unverifiable).
29
See generally FIONNUALA NI AOLÁIN, DINA HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, GENDER, WAR AND THE POST-CONFLICT
PROCESS (2010) (forthcoming) (discussing gendered dimensions of war).
30
See S.C. Res. 1265 (1999) (―Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts and
are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements, gravely concerned by the hardships borne by civilians
during armed conflict, in particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially women, children
and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent
impact this will have on durable peace, reconciliation and development.‖). For compiled statistics on deaths in the
twentieth century‘s wars, see Death Tolls For Major Wars and Atrocities in the Twentieth Century,
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm.
31
Peter Herby, Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 835 INT‘L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 669 (Sept. 30, 1999), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQ3L (―Civilian casualties
outnumber those of combatants in many internal and ethnic conflicts and have increased throughout the century in
parallel with the development of new military technologies.‖). See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS:
ORGANIZED CONFLICT IN A GLOBAL ERA (2006) (discussing changing patterns of violence throughout history).
32
See S.C. Res. 1325 (2000). Resolution 1325 marks ―the first time the Security Council addressed the
disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women; recognized the under-valued and under-utilized
6

Indeed, it is virtually inevitable that women will be subjected to gender-based and sexual
violence in war.34 For most of human history, the rape and sexual abuse of women by the enemy
was an expected spoil, inevitable by-product, or legitimate tactic of war.35 Such acts are now
subject to prosecution before international and domestic tribunals as war crimes and crimes
against humanity, but they continue unabated in today‘s armed conflicts. 36 In conflicts of all
kinds, but especially those motivated by nationalism or ethnic animosity, women may experience
multiple and intersectional forms of gender- and identity-based violence by virtue of being
perceived as idealized symbols of a people or repositories of culture.37 Such attacks on women
work violence at two levels—that of the individual victim and that of the collective to which the
victim belongs. By exemplifying the debility and subjugation of a society‘s male protectors,38
such attacks may exacerbate conflicts and instigate gender-based retaliation.39
contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building[; and]
stressed the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.‖ See Peace
Women, Security Council Resolution 1325, http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/1325index.html. See also
Secretary General, Report to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, U.N. Doc. No. S/2002/1154 (Oct.
16, 2002) (outlining the differential and disproportionate effect of war on women).
33
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
LECTURES 1993 83, 85 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993). See also Charlotte Lindsey, The Impact of
Armed Conflict on Women, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR (Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd,
eds., 2005) and Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 2
(2001). But see Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 605 (2009) (discussing invisibility
of sexual violence committed against men); Shepherd, supra note ___, at 115 (noting that the attention made to
women victims overshadows the extent to which men are also the victims of sexual violence).
34
For example, a World Health Organization study in Liberia revealed that seventy-five percent of women surveyed
were raped during the country‘s civil war. World Health Organization, Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo, Sexual
Gender-Based Violence And Health Facility Needs Assessment (Montserrado And Bong Counties) Liberia (Sept. 6 21, 2004), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_GBV_2004_FINAL.pdf. Statistics suggest that 40,000 women
were raped during war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1990s. In Sierra Leone, combatants sexually assaulted
between 50,000-64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone. See U.N. Family Planning Association, Sexual
Violence Against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath: Realities, Responses and Required Resources,
available at http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/symposium06/docs/finalbrusselsbriefingpaper.pdf. See generally
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1820 (2008), U.N. Doc. S/2009/362 (July
15, 2009); Congressional Research Service, Alexis Arieff, Sexual Violence in African Contexts (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40956.pdf.
35
Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: War On Women, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT‘L L. 33 (2000) (recounting the
invisibility of violence against women until the establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals in the 1990s).
36
The statistics from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a third world war is raging, are harrowing. See
World Health Organization, Responding to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, available at http://www.who.int/hac/crises/countries/cod/2pager.pdf; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative &
Oxfam Int‘l, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (April 2010), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/sexualviolence-drc.html. An average of forty women are raped every day in South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. See Stop Rape Now, Security Council Resolution 1820: Women, Peace & Security, available at
http://www.stoprapenow.org/pdf/Security%20Council%20Resolution%201820.pdf.
37
Wars of national liberation are rarely liberating for women, especially when women are asked to subordinate their
demands to the demands of their polity. See generally Christine Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the
International Use of Force, 12 AUSTR. Y.B. INT‘L L. 279, 285 (1988-89).
38
Brownmiller, supra note ___, at 38 (noting that the ―body of a raped women becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a
parade ground for the victor‘s trooping of the colors. The act that is played out upon her [is] vivid proof of victory
for one and loss and defeat for the other.‖).
39
Doris Buss, Rethinking Rape as a Weapon of War, 17 FEM. LEG. STUDIES 145, 148 (2009) [hereinafter ―Buss,
Rethinking‖] (noting that the reciprocal rapes in war constitute a message of victory or defeat passed between men).
7

Violence against women in war does not come only from military opponents. In wars of
liberation, women may join, or be forcibly conscripted into, rebel armies in which they may
serve as combatants,40 domestic servants, spies, sexual slaves, and ―bush wives.‖41 History has
shown that peacekeepers are not necessarily the benign protectors they are deployed to be.42 In
addition, women often experience the time of war as an extension of a pre-existing ―peacetime‖
continuum of violence in which they experience wrongs such as intimate violence, sexual
harassment, and other forms of private or communal violence.43 Many forms of this everyday
violent behavior are exacerbated in wartime.44 When societies are under stress, the rule of law is
shattered, and cruelty becomes normalized if not legitimated. 45 These multifarious sources of
violence against women hold entire communities hostage and prevent women‘s full access to
schools, markets, social services, and other necessities of life.46
War also harms women in nonviolent ways too. Militarism in general—and war in
particular—consumes resources that might otherwise go to different priorities of the state, such
as education, healthcare, and improving the societal infrastructure.47 As detailed in a recent study
of gender and war,48 it cannot be gainsaid that some women may enjoy some economic benefits
during a conflict. For example, in the mythic tradition of Rosie the Riveter, they may be invited
to fill positions vacated by men. Yet due to their second class citizenship and lack of enforceable
legal rights, women cannot fully capitalize on the black and grey markets that replace formal
markets in war.49 Moreover, they are often reduced to becoming camp-followers to survive,50
dependent on false and temporary conflict economies that offer marginalized employment as
cooks, housekeepers, and runners. Their employers frequently extract paid or unpaid sexual
exploitation.51

40

For a study in Liberia, see Kirsten Johnson, et al., Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With
Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia, 300, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 676 (2008), available at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/300/6/676 (noting that one-third of former combatants were women, onefourth of whom participated in combat).
41
See generally CHRIS COULTER, BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN‘S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN
SIERRA LEONE (2009) (detailing the informal survival relationships entered into by women during the armed conflict
in Sierra Leone).
42
See generally Muno Ndulo, The United Nations Repsonses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and
Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L 127 (2009) (detailing abuses by
peacekeepers). See also S.C. Res. 1888 (2009) (calling for more women to be deployed in peacekeeping operations).
43
See Report of the Secretary-General, In Depth Study of All Forms of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. No
A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20A61122Add1.pdf.
See also Buss, Rethinking, at 145 (arguing that the
hypervisibility of wartime sexual violence renders other forms of violence against women invisible); THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Rozanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
44
Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Gender, Masculinities and Transition in Conflicted Societies, 44 NEW ENGL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
45
Chinkin, supra note ___, at 255.
46
Cook, supra note____, at 128.
47
Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note ___, at 166.
48
Cahn & Ní Aoláin, supra note ___.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 3.
51
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008) (acknowledging crime against
humanity of forced marriage).
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The aftermath of armed conflicts does not necessarily bring relief. Women and children
make up the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons,52 many of whom are fleeing
the world‘s armed conflicts. Once some measure of peace is achieved, women are often pushed
into traditional gender roles in a collective effort to return to a condition of ―normalcy‖ (unless
they are ostracized for having been raped or for their affiliation with combatants during the war).
Levels of gender-based violence may remain high in the immediate post-conflict period as
combatants are demobilized and resocialized to conditions of peace53 and as men reassert the
patriarchal control mechanisms that may have eroded or been suspended during the conflict. As
the African proverb entitling this piece suggests, 54 war—its destructiveness, its culture of
hypermasculinity, and its deep societal consequences—is bad for women as civilians but also for
women as women.
III.

Deconstructing the Crime of Aggression

The codification of the crime of aggression and its complex jurisdictional regime is one
potential response to the truism that war is bad for women. The definition of the crime of
aggression and its jurisdictional regime contain several notable features in need of a careful
deconstruction. The descriptive material in this part will serve as the basis for the gendered
analysis that follows.
A. Acts of Aggression and Crimes of Aggression
The definition of the crime of aggression will be inserted within the Rome Statute as
Article 8bis, just following the war crimes provisions that comprise Article 8.55 The crime of
aggression has been defined as follows:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ―crime of aggression‖ means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ―act of aggression‖ means the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
52

Women represent very close to half of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ―persons of concern‖,
which includes refugees, internally displaced persons, and stateless persons. Forty-five percent are children.
UNHCR, 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND
STATELESS PERSONS 14 (June 15, 2010).
53
Kimberly Theidon, Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of
Former Combatants in Colombia, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2009); Cahn & Ní Aoláin, supra note ___ at 18 n.47.
54
The title of this article is derived from an African proverb: ―When elephants fight the grass gets hurt.‖ See
Afriprov.org, African Proverb of the Month (November 2001), http://www.afriprov.org/index.php/african-proverbof-the-month/27-2001proverbs/172-nov2001.html.
55
The aggression amendments have been denominated Article 8bis (definition), Articles 15bis and 15ter
(jurisdiction), and Article 25(3) (the leadership clause). All other Articles referenced herein appear within the ICC
Statute as adopted at Rome in 1998.
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another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify
as an act of aggression.56
The definition then goes on to provide a list of ―acts of aggression‖ (such as invasion,
bombardment, etc.),57 which are drawn verbatim from Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution
331458 drafted in 1974 to guide the Security Council in determining, in accordance with the U.N.
Charter, the existence of an act of aggression.59
56

Article 8bis, Resolution RC/Res.6. The Elements of Crimes are as follows:
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression.
2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of the State which committed the act of aggression.
3. The act of aggression—the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations—was committed.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed force was
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id. at Annex II. The Elements of Crime are meant to ―assist the Court in the interpretation and application of‖ the
crimes within its jurisdiction. See Article 9, ICC Statute.
57
These acts are:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any
weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another
State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement
of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.
Id. at Article 8bis(2).
58
See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). Other aspects of that Resolution are not
reproduced in the aggression amendments, such as the recognition that acts of aggression constitute the ―most
serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force‖ (Preamble) and that the Security Council may decline to
declare an act of aggression notwithstanding the commission of an enumerated act (Article 2). It is unclear if this list
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The amendment to the Rome Statute that drafters designated Article 8bis defines two
phenomena: a crime of aggression, set out in subsection 1 of the Article 8bis, and an act of
aggression, set out in subsection 2. These two inquiries are considered in reverse order. The act
of aggression committed by a state serves as a predicate for the prosecution of an individual for
the crime of aggression. Thus, an individual will be held liable when he or she plans, prepares,
initiates, or executes one or more acts of aggression through the machinery of a state. The
enumerated acts of aggression reflect their historical origins; absent are acts that might be
considered contemporary forms of aggression, such as embargos, cyber attacks or deliberately
inflicted environmental degradation, although such acts may be assimilated into the provisions
adopted.60
Like General Assembly Resolution 3314, which preceded it, various draft definitions of
the crime of aggression were consistently state-centric; specifically, they envisioned acts of
aggression as phenomena of states, formal military organizations, and international borders.61
That said, one of the amendments adopted at Kampala, Article 8bis(2)(g), may facilitate
prosecutions for aggression in ostensibly non-international conflicts by designating the sending
of armed bands into another state to carry out acts of armed force as a prosecutable act of
aggression. In addition, although the amendments do not address the question directly, it is
foreseeable that standard principles of attribution and state responsibility could be applied in a
way that extends the reach of the prohibition and satisfies the jurisdictional precondition of state
action.62
B. The Jurisdictional Regime
Delegates adopted a two-tiered filter structure for undertaking the determination of
whether a state committed an act of aggression. The operation of the filter depends on the source
of the referral of the situation in question.63 When an investigation is triggered either by a state
party referral or by the prosecutor acting proprio motu, pursuant to Articles 13(a) and (c) of the
Statute respectively, efforts to prosecute the crime will be subject to two filters operating in
tandem.64 Pursuant to the new Article 15bis(6), the prosecutor will first determine whether the

is exhaustive. See Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression,
8(5) J. OF INT‘L CRIM. JUSTICE 1179, 1191 (2010) (suggesting that other forms of state conduct might also qualify as
acts of aggression and opining that other aspects of Resolution 3314 may be relevant to the aggression inquiry).
59
In 1967, the General Assembly delegated the task of defining aggression to a U.N. Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression, which was composed of thirty-five members chosen for their geographic and legal
diversity. It took seven sessions of the Special Committee for the Committee to come up with a consensus definition
that it could recommend to the General Assembly for adoption. Resolution 3314 was adopted by consensus, an
amazing feat given its Cold War provenance. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus
Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance, 10 J. OF INT‘L L. & ECON. 701 (1975) (detailing history of Resolution
3314).
60
In the negotiations, the need to prove an act of state in connection with an aggression prosecution gave rise to
extensive negotiations over which body—the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of
Justice, or the Court itself—would be empowered to make the predicate determination.
61
See Barriga, supra note ___ (setting forth draft definitions of aggression).
62
See infra note __ (discussing applicable standards).
63
See Article 15bis and 15ter of Resolution RC/Res.6.
64
Article 15bis of Resolution RC/Res.6 reads:
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Security Council has made a determination as to whether the putative aggressor state has
committed an act of aggression. If so, the prosecutor will be entitled to include aggression
charges in the indictment pursuant to Article 15bis(7) of the amendments. The Security
Council‘s determination is not binding on the Court,65 which will determine the existence of an
act of aggression anew under the terms of the Statute and the beyond-reasonable-doubt burden of
proof. 66 The Council‘s determination, however, will undoubtedly exert a considerable
evidentiary pull at trial. If, on the other hand, the Council has not made the necessary
determination in six months, the prosecutor can request permission from the Pre-Trial Division
(composed of all the pre-trial judges) to bring such charges pursuant to the new Article 15bis(8).
This request is subject to the procedures set out in Article 15 of the Statute—the same provision
that governs the Prosecutor‘s request to launch an investigation proprio motu. Investigations
triggered by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13(b) are not subject to any filter within
Article 15ter of the amendments. Following the activation of any of the three trigger
mechanisms, the Security Council may exercise authority under Article 16 of the Rome Statute,
and adopt a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to defer the case for a
renewable period of one year.67
The crime of aggression may not be prosecuted pursuant to a state referral or proprio
motu investigation in situations involving states that are not party to the ICC Statute. According
to Article 15bis(5): ―In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State‘s nationals or
on its territory.‖ This blanket exclusion arguably applies to both aggressor and aggressed states.
In addition, pursuant to Article 15bis(4), states parties can choose to opt out of the aggression
provisions prior to their ratification or acceptance of the aggression amendments.68
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13,
paragraphs (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of this article. …
6. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in
respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a
determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant
information and documents.
7. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.
8. Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has
authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with
the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in accordance
with article 16.
Article 15bis, Resolution RC/Res.6.
65
Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(9)(―A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court
shall be without prejudice to the Court‘s own findings under this Statute.‖).
66
ICC Statute, Article 66.
67
Article 16, ICC Statute.
68
That provision reads: ―The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of
aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of such
a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State Party within three years.‖
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C. The Gravity Threshold Applicable to the Act of Aggression Determination
Article 8bis(2) is worded in such a way69 that an act of aggression encompasses any
violation of the territorial integrity, political independence, or sovereignty of another state as
well as any use of armed force that is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.70 Accordingly, the mere
crossing of an international border by military forces without the consent of the neighboring
state, for example, could be condemned an act of aggression regardless of the circumstances, the
consequences of the state‘s actions, or the motive or intent behind the operation.71 Such an act
could then serve as the predicate to a prosecution for the crime of aggression, if the act satisfies
the requirements set forth in Article 8bis(1).
Although the statutory language is quite broad, and makes no express reference to
codified or uncodified exceptions to the Charter‘s prohibition on the use of armed force, the new
Elements of Crime for aggression clarify that only breaches of the Charter constitute acts of
aggression.72 In addition, understandings adopted in connection with the aggression amendments
make clear that a gravity threshold applies to the preliminary determination of the existence of an
act of aggression by the Security Council or Pre-Trial Division.73
D. The Leadership Clause

69

Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 8bis(2) (defining ―act of aggression‖ as ―the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations‖).
70
This language, with the exception of the added reference to ―sovereignty‖ and the deletion of the concept of a
threat to the peace, is drawn from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (―All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.‖).
71
Although it may be argued that the reference to consistency with the Charter might prevent a bona fide
humanitarian intervention or act of self-defense from being considered an act of aggression, the ―any other manner‖
language technically qualifies ―the use of armed force‖ and not ―sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence.‖ This ―any other manner‖ language thus appears to broaden, rather than narrow, the prohibition
contained in both Articles 2(4) of the Charter and Article 8bis.
72
The fourth element of the crime of aggression dictates that ―[t]he perpetrator was aware of the factual
circumstances that established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.‖ Resolution RC/Res.6 at 5.
73
Understandings 6 and 7 clarify the methodology for determining the existence of an act of aggression:
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of
force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires
consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts
concerned and their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be
sufficient to justify a ―manifest‖ determination. No one component can be significant enough to
satisfy the manifest standard by itself.
Res 6, Annex III.
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Once the determination has been made that an act of aggression has been committed, the
analysis shifts to determine whether a crime of aggression has been committed. The crime of
aggression is subject to a leadership clause, which provides that only those individuals occupying
the top policy-making echelons of a military or civilian hierarchy74 can be prosecuted for the
crime of aggression. 75 A footnote to the corresponding Elements of Crimes makes clear that
more than one person may be criminally liable for a particular act of aggression.76 The crime of
aggression will be subject to all the forms of responsibility set forth in Article 25.77
E. Mens Rea
In terms of mens rea, the first element of the crime is a conduct element subject to a
heightened mental state of intent according to the Elements of Crimes. Subsequent circumstantial
elements, such as the defendant‘s occupation of a leadership position, are subject to the lower
mental state of knowledge.78 This formulation seems to exclude a constructive knowledge, or
―should have known,‖ standard. The elements of the crime encompassing the commission of an
act of aggression in manifest violation of the Charter is subject to ―knowledge of fact‖ mental
state, which requires a showing that the defendant was aware of the factual circumstances that
rendered the applicable state‘s use of force inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.79 The perpetrator
is not required to have knowledge of the precise legal doctrines governing uses of force.80
74

A similar approach was taken in the post-WWII period when tribunals convicted only those individuals at the
policy-making level. See, e.g., United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 462, 488
(1949) (holding that defendants must ―be in a position to shape or influence the policy that brings about [the]
initiation or … continuation‖ of an aggressive war). This excluded ―commanders and staff officers below the policy
level responsible for planning campaigns, preparing means for carrying them out, moving against a country on
orders and fighting a war after it has been instituted.‖ Id. at 490-91. Individuals deemed ―policy makers‖ included
civilian industrials with considerable influence over the government. United States v. Krauch (I.G. Farben), 8
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
10 1081, 1124-5 (1949) (―To depart from the concept that only major war criminals—that is, those persons in the
political, military and industrial fields, for example, who were responsible for the formulation and execution of
policies—may be held liable for waging wars of aggression, would lead far afield. Under such circumstances there
could be no practical limitation on criminal responsibility that would not include, on principle, the private soldier on
the battlefield, the farmer who increased his production of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces…‖).
75
The text, ―In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State‖ will be inserted
after Article 25, paragraph 3 of the Statute. Resolution RC/Res.6, Foot soldiers will not be subject to such charges
before the ICC; however, they can still be prosecuted pursuant to Article 8 of the Rome Statute for any war crimes
committed in connection with an act of aggression. The Rome Statute abrogates all immunities at Article 27.
76
Footnote 1 reads: ―With respect to an act of aggression, more than one person may be in a position that meets
these criteria.‖ Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note __.
77
Although there had been some discussion about identifying separate forms of responsibility applicable only to the
crime of aggression, this proposal was not pursued. See Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of
Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 548-9 (2008)
(recounting forms of responsibility options).
78
By the terms of Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute, knowledge ―means awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.‖ Article 30, ICC Statute.
79
These include the occurrence of an armed attack against another state, the absence of Security Council
authorization, and the absence of a prior attack by the putative victim state.
80
A similar knowledge-of-fact formulation is contained in Article 8 of the ICC Statute on war crimes, which
clarifies that it need not be shown that the defendant undertook a legal evaluation as to the existence of an armed
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F. The Gravity Threshold Applicable to the Crime of Aggression Determination
Not every act of aggression will support a prosecution for the crime of aggression.
Rather, only those acts of aggression that by their ―character, gravity and scale‖ constitute a
―manifest violation‖ of the Charter when viewed objectively 81 can give rise to the crime of
aggression. The term ―manifest,‖ which was never defined,82 emerged as a compromise term to
bridge the gap between two camps. The first camp included delegates who wanted no threshold
at all, on either the theory that every act of aggression should be subject to prosecution83 or the
theory that the Statute already applied only to ―the most serious crimes of international
concern.‖84 The second camp included delegates who wanted a higher threshold than signified by
the term ―manifest;‖ that is, they wanted to limit prosecutions to ―flagrant‖ breaches of the
Charter,85 wars of aggression,86 ―unlawful‖ uses of force, or acts of aggression geared toward
occupying or annexing territory.87
The term ―manifest‖ was perennially controversial during the negotiations in light of its
ambiguity of meaning. To some, the word referred to the degree of legal clarity or ambiguity
surrounding the illegality of the act of aggression. To others, the word denoted some level of
seriousness in terms of the impugned act‘s scale, consequences or willfulness. These semantic
debates in turn revealed conflicting goals underlying the threshold element. Although the
concept of ―borderline‖ case was often employed, there was no consensus on exactly which
types of situations should not be subject to prosecution. Some states seemed intent on precluding
conflict, its classification as international or non-international, or the status of the victims as protected persons. See
Elements of Crime, U.N. Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002), http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf.
81
The Elements of the Crime of Aggressions state: ―The term ‗manifest‘ is an objective qualification.‖ See Annex
II, Resolution RC/Res.6.
82
Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests one useful definition in connection
with provisions governing treaty ratifications in violation of domestic law. ―A violation is manifest if it would be
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith.‖ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980), Art. 46 [hereinafter ―Vienna Convention‖].
83
Iran, for one, insisted until the final days of the Kampala Conference that any act of aggression would constitute a
―manifest violation‖ of the U.N. Charter that should give rise to individual criminal responsibility.
84
Rome Statute, supra note ___, art. 1.
85
See Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June 2006—
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1), reprinted in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF
THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, 141, 143-44 (Stefan Barriga et al., eds.
2009) (summarizing debates over the term ―flagrant‖ versus ―manifest.‖). Early draft texts employed the term
―flagrant,‖ but this term disappeared in 2007, apparently because it was considered too high a barrier to prosecution.
See Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (January 2007—ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/1),
reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 131, 133 (discussing term ―manifest‖).
86
See, e.g., Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June
20078—ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1), reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 109, 199 (discussing debates over
including reference to ―war of aggression‖).
87
Germany, for example, supported a high threshold for the crime, namely that the act of aggression had ―the object
or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof by the
armed forces of the attacking State.‖ See, e.g., Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Proposal Submitted by Germany, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13 (July 30, 1999), available at U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/DP.13.
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the assertion of jurisdiction over minor acts of aggression, such as frontier scuffles88 or crossborder coast guard incursions; others wanted to exclude cases in which there was or would be no
clear international consensus as to whether the state had committed an unlawful act. Some
argued that the modifier ―manifest‖ accomplishes neither of these two goals, but rather threatens
to permit prosecutions of both low-level uses of force and potentially lawful or beneficial casus
belli, such as bona fide humanitarian interventions; armed responses to terrorist attacks by nonstate actors;89 actions in ex post or anticipatory self-defense; assistance to wars of national of
liberation, peacekeeping or stability missions; actions to enforce no fly zones; actions in defense
of nationals or to rescue hostages; and exercises of hot pursuit or the abduction of fugitives.90
Supporters of the term argued in turn that the list of acts in Article 8bis(2) would ensure that
minor incursions across an international border would not be prosecuted as the crime of
aggression.
G. Defenses to the Crime of Aggression
Delegates did not seriously consider amending the Rome Statute provisions addressed to
available defenses. 91 As a result, the crime of aggression is not subject to any special
justifications or excuses. 92 In theory, individual defendants can invoke all of the existing
88

The Libyan-Egyptian War of July 21-24, 1977 provides an example. A group of Libyan civilians protesting
Egypt‘s impending peace treaty with Israel marched to the Egyptian border. They were stopped and turned back by
the Egyptian Army. Libya responded by firing artillery over the border. On July 21, it sent a tank battalion over the
border to conduct a raid against an Egyptian army position in Sallum. The Egyptians expected the incursion, and a
much larger force ambushed the Libyans, harrying them back across the border. The following three days saw
repeated Egyptian air and commando strikes against targets within Libya. Egypt maintained ground and air
superiority until an armistice was brokered by Algeria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
89
The International Court of Justice has opined that the Charter authorization of self-defense applies only to attacks
by states. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 ICJ 131, 194 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/131/1671.pdf. But see Sec.
Council Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1277(2001) (invoking the right of individual
or collective self-defence in response to 9/11 attacks in preamble).
90
On March 1, 2008, for example, the Colombian military crossed the border into Ecuador and targeted elements of
the FARC 48th Front, which was suspected of harboring Raúl Reyes, a senior FARC commander. The Colombians
launched a combined air and ground assault on FARC positions on the Ecuadorian side of the border; when they met
resistance, the Colombians launched an artillery strike on the encampment, killing some 20 fighters from the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), including Reyes. The regional uproar over the incursion was
settled at the March 7, 2008, Rio Group meeting in Santo Domingo. See Council on Foreign Relations, FARC, ELN:
Colombia‟s Left-Wing Guerillas, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272
(August 19, 2009).
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See, e.g., Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June
2005—ICC-ASP/4/32), reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 167, 173 (compiling discussion as to whether
Article 33 addressing superior orders should be amended by, or referred to in, the aggression amendments); Stefan
Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, in BARRIGA,
supra note ___, at 1, 5 (noting that drafters endeavored to insert the aggression amendments into the ICC Statute as
smoothly as possible without disturbing the provisions on defenses).
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Some commentators, such as the former Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer, proposed that the
amendments include special exclusions to the crime of aggression, such as with respect to uses of armed force or
deployments of armed forces made pursuant Security Council authorization, the ―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution
(Res. 377 (1950)), or the inherent right of self-defense acknowledged in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See David
Scheffer, A Pragmatic Approach to Jurisdictional and Definitional Requirements for the Crime of Aggression in the
Rome Statute, 41 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT‘L L. 397, 409 (2009).
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defenses subject to whatever adaptations are necessary set out in the ICC Statute.93 According to
Article 31(1)(c)—the only provision that implicates the aggression determination directly—
neither self-defense nor the defense of others is automatically proven in situations in which the
defendant is acting on behalf of a state engaged in self-defense.94 At trial, the Trial Chamber may
consider additional defenses pursuant to Article 31(3)95 and the applicable Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.96
Although delegates ostensibly adopted these complex provisions by consensus, the above
analysis reveals the existence of a high degree of disagreement, controversy, and concerted
silence that belies true agreement among states as to the definition and reach of the crime. It also
begs the normative question of whether the Rome Statute should include the crime of aggression
at all. To a certain extent, of course, this question has become a moot one; important and
influential blocs of states (including the interlocking members of the Non-Aligned Movement,
the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries, the Union of South American Nations,
the so-called African Group of States Parties to the ICC, the Arab League, and the European
Union) invested considerable energy in achieving the adoption of the aggression amendments.
To varying degrees, these states are committed to seeing this project come to fruition. That said,
the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a year after thirty states
parties have ratified the amendments. 97 Even then, the ability to prosecute the crime is not
automatic; the Assembly of States Parties must decide in 2017 whether and how to activate the
various trigger mechanisms. 98 At that time, the operationalization of the crime of aggression
could conceivably be delayed, amended, or even abandoned.
IV.

Is the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Good For Women?

These preliminary observations on the definition of the crime of aggression lead to the
central question posed by this article: how will the codification and eventual prosecution of the
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute impact the lives of women? As the analysis that follows
reveals, many central elements of the final package adopted in Kampala cut two ways. A number
of considerations commend the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute in
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These include the defenses of mental disease or defect, intoxication, self-defense, the defense of others, and duress
(Article 31(1)); mistake of fact or law (Article 32); and superior orders (Article 33). The defense of property may be
raised only with respect to war crimes charges and only when force is employed proportionately to protect essential
property against an unlawful use of force. Article 31(1)(c), ICC Statute. In particular, Article 31(1)(c) reads: ―in the
case of war crimes, [the self-defense and the defense of others is available to protect] property which is essential for
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against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the
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That Article reads: ―At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than
those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21.‖
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See Rule 80, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (setting forth procedures for raising a defense under Article 31(3)),
ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II-A) (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3CB9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf.
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Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(2) (―The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of
aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.‖);
Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15ter(2) (same).
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Id. at Articles 15bis(3) and 15ter(3).
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theory. Most of the concerns anticipate how the crime might be invoked and prosecuted in
practice. Without any firm practice on which to rely, all that remains is speculation, yielding both
cautious potential and potential cautions.
A. Definitional Limitations and Advantages
Unlike the other core crimes within the ICC Statute, there are no gender-specific charging
elements in the definition of the crime. An obvious substantive limitation to the aggression
amendments is the fact that they are confined to acts of aggression committed by states against
other states, an approach that serves to reinforce the statist orientation of international law.99
There is no notion of a crime of aggression that may be committed by non-state actors, such as
insurgents or terrorists, or by states against their own citizens.100 These blind spots significantly
discount the diversity of threats to international peace and security in contemporary international
relations101 and guarantee that the prohibition on aggression will apply to only a fraction of the
armed conflicts endured by women. In this way, the crime of aggression is not coextensive with
the modern taxonomy of conflict classification under international humanitarian law. 102 It is only
when the aggressive acts of non-state actors may be attributed to another state according to
general principles of state responsibility that the crime of aggression may apply more broadly.103
These principles of attribution may enable aggression charges to be brought in armed conflicts
that on their surface appear to be internal, but which may in fact sufficiently involve other states
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This statist approach is arguably retrograde given the increased application of international law to non-state actors,
such as terrorist groups, indigenous peoples, multinationals, non-governmental organizations, etc. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 159-165 (1989) (discussing deprivations of women‘s
rights attributed to elements of civil society); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising From
Conduct Of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 (2005).
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See Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Freedom Fighters” and “Terrorists”: When, if Ever, is Non-State Violence
Legitimate in International Law?, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373590.
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Mark A. Drumbl, The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: The Push to Criminalize
Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT‘L L. 291, 306 (2009). See also Carston
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the Definition of “Aggression”, 23 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 875, 876-77 (2010) (noting that the ―very concept of
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individual rights).
102
Not without controversy, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions re-conceptualized wars of national liberation,
wars against colonial domination, and wars against racist regimes as international armed conflicts under
international law. Article 1(4), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (June 8, 1977) (applying rules on international armed
conflicts to ―armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.‖) [hereinafter ―Protocol I‖]. See Judith Gardam,
A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of Humanitarian Law, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT‘L L. 265, 270 (1988-1989)
(critiquing the elevation of liberation conflicts to international status and the extension of combatant immunity at the
expense of protection for civilians).
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See, e.g., Article 8, International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(―the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the State in
carrying out the conduct.‖).
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acting through non-state proxies. 104 Because gender-based violence is often viewed as a
phenomenon of the private sphere, attributing such crimes to state actors has proved difficult
over the years. Similar problems of attribution may arise where the acts of non-state actors must
be attributed to states parties to the ICC for the purpose of an aggression prosecution. If we
believe prosecutions for the crime of aggression will improve the lives of women—by deterring
uses of armed force or providing a vector for retribution—the fact that the definition of the crime
has been drafted to address only a narrow class of armed conflicts will limit its impact
considerably.
The leadership element of the crime has both commendable and worrisome aspects. On
the one hand, the focus of the aggression amendments on leaders, rather than followers, may
facilitate the prosecution of the architects of aggression. It may be difficult to connect individuals
sitting at the pinnacle of a chain of command far from the events in question to the commission
of war crimes or crimes against humanity through principles of derivative or superior liability,
either because they can hide behind lawful rules of engagement or otherwise evade responsibility
through raising reasonable doubt about their knowledge of abuses 105 or ability to exercise
effective control over subordinates.106 That said, the ad hoc tribunals have enjoyed some success
in prosecuting the caliber of political leaders who might eventually be indicted for the crime of
aggression: Slobodan Milošević, 107 Momcilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, 108 and Radovan
Karadžić (before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); Theoneste
Bagasora and Jean Kambanda (before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Charles
Taylor (before the Special Court for Sierra Leone); and Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan (before
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). These leaders, however, hailed from
104

Because the acts of non-state actors would be attributed to a state as a jurisdictional precondition, the effective
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The ICTY convicted Biljana Plavšić, former President of the Republika Srpska. The Prosecutor had indicted her
for genocide, complicity in genocide, and the crimes against humanity of persecution, extermination, killing,
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to 11 years‘ imprisonment, though she was granted early release for ―good behavior‖ and ―substantial evidence of
rehabilitation.‖ Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT–00–39 & 40/1–T, Sentencing Judgement (Feb. 27, 2003).
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weak, vanquished, obsolete, or pariah regimes. The ICC arrest warrants against President AlBashir of the Sudan provide a first test for whether the ICC will be able to follow suit. 109 Even
with ostensible Security Council backing, Al-Bashir remains at large, although he is increasingly
marginalized internationally if not domestically. 110 If the likes of Al-Bashir cannot be
apprehended for the commission of crimes against humanity and genocide against his own
people, mustering the political will to capture leaders charged with the more controversial crime
of aggression will be difficult.
On the other hand, no one has systematically asked women whether they would prefer for
those who initiate the armed conflicts that unleash other international crimes to be prosecuted if
it is at the expense of the local warlords whom victims might more directly associate with
abuses. 111 While the prosecution of such higher ups for the crime of aggression may bring
international attention to a region and a conflict, it may also absorb the limited capacity of the
Court, leaving lower-level offenders to be prosecuted locally, if at all. Where gender-specific
violence is at issue, women may assign primary responsibility to the direct perpetrators for the
crimes committed in their communities and against them specifically, rather than the leaders.
The current tendency of the ICC to focus on militia leaders demonstrates the importance of
positive complementarity, the promise of which has not yet been fulfilled in the situations
currently under investigation or indictment by the ICC.112 Indeed, the domestic prosecution of
gender-based violence lags in a number of jurisdictions under consideration by the ICC, so
leaving such prosecutions to domestic courts may amount to impunity for the individuals whom
women would most want to see prosecuted.
B. Jurisdictional Hurdles
Assuming the aggression amendments do eventually become operational, it remains to be
seen whether they will ever be invoked given the complex jurisdictional regime. There are many
ways in which the architects of war and lesser forms of state violence may be insulated from
109

See The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (July 12, 2010).
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generates intense international controversy. See CNN, Kenya, African Union Defend Bashir Visit (Aug. 31, 2010),
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111
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HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, ET AL., BUILDING PEACE, SEEKING JUSTICE: A POPULATION–BASED SURVEY ON
ATTITUDES ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 26
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approximately a third of respondents in the Central African Republic called for the prosecution of the top political
leaders). For example, studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo more frequently suggested that militia members
were a higher prosecutorial priority than political leaders. See HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER ET AL., LIVING WITH FEAR: A
POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN
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Uganda, by contrast, respondents favored prosecution of the leaders of the Lord‘s Resistance Army rather than
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prosecution for the crime of aggression. At the procedural level, and as is the case with all the
crimes within the Court‘s jurisdiction, states parties and the Security Council may decline to
exercise their authority to refer aggression situations to the Court. 113 In the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, the Prosecutor may decide not to launch investigations proprio motu
pursuant to Article 15 or may decline to go forward with referred cases in ―the interests of
justice‖ per Article 53(1)(c). The Pre-Trial Chamber may not confirm any aggression charges as
it must pursuant to Article 61. The Security Council may use its Article 16 deferral powers to
delay cases indefinitely; this virtually ensures that nationals of the Council‘s five permanent
members, or their close allies, will never come before the Court even if they should be
implicated in international crimes. The two jurisdictional filters may not render the necessary
determination that a state committed an act of aggression.
Beyond these baseline procedural hurdles, however, lie more fundamental limitations to
the reach of the aggression amendments. In the absence of a Security Council trigger, there are
gaping holes in the crime‘s jurisdictional regime. It excludes non-party states altogether,114 and
it allows states parties to opt out of the aggression provisions. 115 In this way, the Court‘s
jurisdictional reach over the crime of aggression is stunted. By way of contrast, the other core
crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) may be prosecuted so long as either
the state of nationality of the accused or the territorial state is a party to the Statute. 116 This
differential regime stemmed from the fact that delegates viewed the crime of aggression as
implicating state sovereignty more concretely and acutely than the other atrocity crimes given
that the crime has at its core the action of a sovereign state, 117 which under international law
enjoys certain prerogatives of agency, autonomy, and self-determination.
C. State Consent
The aggression regime is consent-based. The principle of consent, as a manifestation of
agency, plays a central role in both public international law and feminist theory. In the former,
state consent has historically provided the basis for the formation and binding nature of
international norms (as when states voluntarily join treaties, engage in state practice, and
articulate opinio juris) as well as for the jurisdiction of international institutions.118 Indeed, the
classical theory that international law is solely consent-based 119 gives rise to one of its most
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fundamental and enduring criticisms. 120 Consent is also at the root of the perennial debate
between positivists and natural law theorists, the latter of whom insist that international law
contains normative content independent of state consent and that morality is essential to law.121
State consent remains salient within international law notwithstanding the trend toward other
more institutional or parliamentarian norm-setting processes. 122 In feminist theory, consent
functions as an analog to sovereignty in international law as an attribute and entitlement of
personhood often denied to women.123
Allowing potential aggressor states to choose whether or not to be bound to the penal
prohibition of aggression warps the privilege of consent, which in many areas of the criminal law
belongs to the victim if it is relevant at all.124 To be sure, the opt-out is theoretically available to
both potential aggressor and potential victim states. It is clear, however, that the opt-out
provision is primarily oriented toward potential aggressor states.125 Nonetheless, there may be
valid reasons why aggressed states may not want acts of aggression perpetrated on their
territories to be the subject of prosecution before the ICC, as when such proceedings might
exacerbate—rather than defuse—a situation, hamper the ability of warring parties to reach
political or diplomatic solutions, undermine efforts at reconciliation between embattled societies,
or risk the revelation of state secrets or sensitive intelligence.126 If states parties choose to avail
themselves of the opt-out, it will insulate particular territories and conflicts from prosecution for
the crime of aggression. In making the decision to join the aggression amendments or to exercise
the right to opt out of them, states will not necessarily consult women and other vulnerable
segments of their populace.
120
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Of course, it is not inevitable that states parties will act to exit the aggression provisions.
A genuine faith in the crime, the power of inertia, and contrary pressure from domestic and
international civil society may make it undesirable or politically difficult for states parties to
avail themselves of the opt out option set out in the Kampala package.127 At the same time, by
premising the provisions‘ entry into force and jurisdictional reach on exercises of consent, the
drafters of the aggression regime created opportunities for the exercise or withholding of consent
to be coerced, which feminist theory has long demonstrated is an inevitable consequence of
power differentials. Both the ratification process and the opt-out regime threaten a ratification
―cold war‖ among the Assembly of States Parties as strong states or blocs of states try to coerce
parties to either join or reject the aggression provisions. Potential victim states—the feminized
party in any aggression dyad—in particular may find themselves under pressure to opt out of the
aggression amendments and thus to immunize their territory from aggression charges.
The ability of the Security Council to refer situations to the Court under Article 15ter
without reference to state consent (and to serve as a primary filter for aggression cases brought
under Article 15bis) will become that much more important, assuming the Assembly of States
Parties decides to activate this trigger mechanism over the crime.128 Ensuring a central role for
the Council in aggression prosecutions provides an opening for the principles set forth in
Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, and 1888129—which recognized that wartime genderbased and sexual violence against women constitutes a threat to international peace and security
that may exacerbate conflicts—to contribute a gender perspective to the penal enforcement of the
prohibition against aggression.130 Indeed, the Darfur referral131 has already demonstrated the way
in which Council action can promote accountability for gender-based and sexual violence.132
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Those resolutions may also enable advocates to argue that military interventions in situations
involving gender-based violence should receive Council approval.
D. The Crime’s Reach: Collateral Damage
These observations about the fundamental responsibility of the architects of aggression
point to a rationale advanced in support of the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome
Statute. From the perspective of women, prosecuting the crime of aggression suggests a way that
much of the harm experienced by women in war can be captured by international criminal law in
a way it is not currently. 133 In particular, so-called collateral damage—incidental harm to
civilians that occurs in the pursuit of a lawful military objective—will become the evidentiary
foundation for many charges of aggression that might be pursued.
Adding the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute has filled what many have viewed as
a lacuna in the pantheon of international crimes.134 In the words of the Nuremberg Tribunal in its
Judgment: ―To initiate a war of aggression … is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole.‖ 135 The theory is that once the peace is breached by the
commission of an act of aggression or the launching of a war of aggression, conditions exist that
unleash other forms of violence. Troops are deployed, arms proliferate, detention centers are
established, human groups are vilified, and brutality becomes normalized.
At the doctrinal level, war crimes cannot be committed outside of a state of armed
conflict or occupation, and violence perpetrated by a military force can constitute crimes against
humanity when the civilian population is attacked on a widespread or systematic basis.136 The
Rwandan tragedy demonstrates that an armed conflict can serve as a pretext for genocide.137 A
state of war thus enables, encourages, and exacerbates multiple forms of violence, including
gender-based violence. Given the demonstrated causal relationship between acts of aggression
and other atrocities, a prosecution for the crime of aggression has the potential to empower the
Court to teller a fuller story of a particular dispute, expose root causes, and assign legal
responsibility—not just moral opprobrium or diplomatic ire—to those who would unleash
violence on the globe.138
133
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(discussing how the prosecutor‘s allegations showed ―that the armed conflict had been used as pretext to unleash an
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(2010) (―‗To judge conventional war crimes while ignoring the fundamental decision to initiate war is like punishing
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It is clear that the crime of aggression may be the only charge that can be brought in the
wake of a clean, but unlawful, war or in response to an armed attack by a national armed force
that does not rise to the level of an armed conflict or target protected persons. 139 It is often
assumed that aggressive operations will be more brutal and indiscriminate than other uses of
force, and this is often borne out in practice. In such conflicts, a comprehensive war crimes
indictment will go far toward assigning responsibility for the horrors of war. But, even a cleanly
fought but aggressive war harms civilians, societies, and the international community. Under
these circumstances, aggression may be the only charge that can be leveled against responsible
leaders, thus increasing the retributive potential of international criminal law.
Where the aggression charge is at the forefront of an indictment, the conceptualization of
the crime will inevitably not be confined to the singular act of crossing an international border
with guns drawn, but rather will encompass a consideration of a host of consequential harms to
the victim state and its populace. Thus, an aggression charge can indirectly condemn conduct
that would otherwise escape penal sanction because it is not a war crime, a crime against
humanity, or an act of genocide. These consequential harms can include the killing of privileged
combatants dans le combat, the quintessential act of war; the use of proportionate force against
lawful targets; and even so-called collateral damage. All such acts may become indirectly
actionable through an aggression prosecution. Most importantly, the daily harms experienced by
women in war, whose fate is so often concealed behind the notion of collateral damage, can
serve as an evidentiary basis for, and gain greater visibility through, the crime of aggression.
Without such consideration of the concrete consequences or effects of an act of aggression, the
Court would be unable to evaluate the gravity threshold, and the crime of aggression would be
reduced to a mere abstraction.
The potential of the codification and prosecution of the crime of aggression to condemn
the consequences of war was recognized during the post-World War II era, when the Allies first
prosecuted crimes against the peace, although this theory of expansive responsibility never
a petty thief while letting a murderer escape.‘‖) (quoting Yasuaki Ōnuma, Beyond Victor‟s Justice, XI JAPAN ECHO
63, 68 (1984)).
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facie evidence of an act of aggression … ―). The victims of the Cheonan attack were 46 crew members, all male, and
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are taken into account, aggression would be the only chargeable crime. See Democracy Now!, Historian Bruce
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note ___.
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received the full blessing of either international tribunal.140 Lawyers within the U.S. delegation
developed the legal position that those who initiated unlawful wars of aggression were therefore
responsible for all the wrongs that then ensued.141 This argument found particular expression in
the Tokyo proceedings before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), in
which the defendants were charged in one set of counts with murder and mayhem in addition to
crimes against the peace.142 A number of these counts focused on conventional war crimes, such
as the killing of prisoners of war and the literal and figurative rape of Nanking. Counts thirtyseven through forty-three, however, focused on the killing of members of the armed forces
during Japan‘s aggressive actions. For example, Count thirty-eight of the indictment charged a
number of defendants with participation in a common plan or conspiracy the object of which was
to ―kill and murder … both members of the armed forces … and civilians.‖143 Count thirty-nine
140

See United States v. Altstötter et al. (―The Justice Trial‖), UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, VI LAW
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Nations: Making Deterrence Personal, 22 MD. J. INT‘L L. & TRADE 1, 1 (1998). But see Hersch Lauterpacht, The
Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 206, 217 n.4 (surmising that Shawcross was
―referring not to the responsibility of the individual members of the armed forces of the aggressor but only to the
liability of those guilty of planning and instigating the war.‖).
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See International Military Tribunal for the Far East Indictment, Annex 6 to Judgment, available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-A6.html. Count 37 read:
The following Counts charge the crimes of murder, and conspiracy to murder, being acts for
which it is charged that the persons named and each of them are individually responsible, being at
the same time Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity,
contrary to all the paragraphs of Article 5 of the said Charter, to International Law, and to the
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Id. See also Boister, supra note ___ at 439.
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The Count charged the defendants with endeavoring to:
unlawfully to kill and murder the persons described below, by initiating unlawful hostilities
against the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the British
Commonwealth of Nations, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Thailand, and
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said armed forces of Japan could not therefore, acquire the rights of lawful belligerents.
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similarly charged the attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when Japan and the United States were at
peace, and the deaths of members of the naval and military forces of the United States. In
support of these charges, it was argued that the Japanese defendants could be charged with
murder simpliciter in connection with all civilian and combatant deaths in the Pacific theater,
even if they would otherwise have been lawful killings under the jus in bello. The theory was
that the illegality of the war rendered Japanese defendants unprivileged combatants and thus
vitiated any defense of combatant immunity. 144 For their part, the defendants argued that
―killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constituted violations of
the rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not
murder.‖145
Notwithstanding that the case was teed up to challenge the conceptual divide between the
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, the Tokyo Tribunal ultimately dismissed those counts
addressed to a conspiracy to commit any crimes other than crimes against the peace 146 and
addressed the harms alleged in the murder counts in connection with the omnibus crimes against
the peace counts.147 The Tribunal seemed to recognize that the theory of comprehensive liability
suggested by the murder counts would swallow all the other particulars of the indictment148 when
it held: ―In all cases the killing is alleged as arising from the unlawful waging of war. … If …
the war, in any particular sense, is held to have been unlawful, then this involves unlawful
killings not only upon the dates and at the places stated in these counts [of murder] but at all
places in the theatre of war and at all times throughout the period of the war.‖149
The Allies‘ attempt to hold Japanese defendants liable for all the harm caused by their
aggressive war reflects the enduring intuitive appeal of the proposition that an otherwise lawful
act of war, such as a proportionate attack on a military objective, committed within the context of
an unlawful war is itself ipso facto unlawful even if no identifiable war crime has been
committed. This proposition is, while appealing, doctrinally flawed. The long-standing
distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello reflects the understanding that an
unlawful war can be fought lawfully and a just war can be fought unlawfully. Thus,
considerations of the right to use force are detached from considerations of how force is used or
its consequences,150 and ―once the primary rules prohibiting the use of force (i.e., the ius ad
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(―‗If [the war is illegal] must it not follow that when Hitler and his cohorts entered Czechoslovakia etc., ‗vi et armis‘
[―with force and arms‖] they were not lawful belligerents under international law and therefore have no defense to a
criminal charge or murder and banditry? For I take it that ‗Lawful Belligerency‘ is a soldier‘s only defense to a
charge of murder.‘‖). Indeed, charging straight murder would have avoided the ex post facto problems posed by
charging crimes against the peace. Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV.
397, 455-56 (1945-1946).
145
Judgment, 101 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL 48,436a (R. John Pritchard, ed. 1998) [hereinafter
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of Force” in the International Curriculum, 6 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 219, 221-2 (1995).
27

bellum) have been violated, the subsidiary rules of ius in bello must apply.‖151 This acoustic
separation is pragmatic as well as philosophical: the goal is to ensure compliance with
humanitarian law regardless of which party is responsible for breaching international peace in
the first place.152 Pursuant to the parity or symmetry thesis of international humanitarian law
(IHL), the many protective principles of the jus in bello apply equally to all sides of a conflict,
without reference to reciprocity and regardless of whether the jus ad bellum has been violated.153
The severability and independence of the two sets of doctrines also reflects states‘ contractual
obligations; once the Geneva Conventions achieved universal ratification, all states of the world
became equally bound by the core jus in bello prohibitions contained in those treaties, which
apply regardless of the origins or causes of the conflict.154
E. International Humanitarian Law Repercussions
Adding the crime of aggression to the jurisdiction of the ICC and enabling the
prosecution of the deployment of armed force for unlawful ends has the potential to create
bridges across the conceptual divide between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The apparent
untraversability of these bodies of law exists for a reason, however. As such, their linkage may
create negative consequences vis-à-vis the efficacy of some of the core protective doctrines of
humanitarian law that apply to all combatants, regardless of which side started the conflict in the
first place. Now that the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello will intersect in the ICC, labeling one
side to a conflict ―the aggressor‖ and the other side ―the aggressed‖ may undermine support for
IHL on both sides, weakening a source of protection in international law for women and other
vulnerable groups. The predicate aggression determination may also lead to differential liability
for other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC among combatants affiliated with the
aggressor and aggressed states.
Enabling the prosecution of the crime of aggression may undermine support for the jus in
bello among belligerents representing the putative aggressor state. Governmental support at the
highest level—where rules of engagement are drafted, targets indentified, and military strategy
developed—is crucial to ensure compliance with humanitarian law more broadly. If leaders and
policy-makers are susceptible to the threat of an aggression prosecution, an institutional
commitment to adhere to humanitarian law may flag and weaken incentives to ensure that acts of
151
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war are implemented in accordance with humanitarian law. Potential defendants may
legitimately fear that there will be a thumb on the scale against them in any war crimes
prosecution when the conflict itself has been declared aggressive and their state determined to be
the aggressor.155 Indeed, at the most radical of levels, does the principle of military necessity—
which requires that armed attacks be designed and implemented to defeat the opponent
militarily—have any meaning in the context of an unjust war? 156 Unless judges rigorously
cordon off the aggression and war crimes analyses, 157 the proportionality analysis and other
applications of IHL may differ among combatants depending on which side of the conflict they
represent.158 This may create perceptions of bias and unfairness among accused individuals from
different sides to a conflict.
Paradoxically, the threat of prosecution for the crime of aggression may weaken the
enforcement of humanitarian law by those deemed to be the aggressed party as well.
Combatants hailing from the aggressed state may feel a lesser incentive to adhere to these rules,
because they have been deemed to be engaged in a just war.159 Prosecutors, judges and other
observers for that matter may be more forgiving of breaches in such conflicts and cut combatants
some slack—consciously or unconsciously.160 In the context of criminal proceedings, this bias
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may have an impact on the charges that are brought, the convictions that are handed down, and
the sentences that are imposed.161
This potentiality arose in the Sierra Leonean context in the case against the surviving
leaders of the Civilian Defense Forces, pro-government militia that formed to assist the
government in resisting the Revolutionary United Front/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
rebel juntas and restoring the democratically-elected government.162 In a case involving charges
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber rejected the defendants‘ defense
of necessity,163 but determined that the fact that the defendants were fighting for a just cause was
a mitigating factor at sentencing. 164 In fact, one judge would have acquitted the defendants
altogether. 165 Over a dissent, 166 the Appeals Chamber reversed, ruling that allowing
consideration into the political motives behind the defendants‘ participation in the conflict would
provide ―implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violates the law—the precise conduct
this Special Court was established to punish.‖ 167 The sentences were increased to 15 and 20
years.168
Adherence to IHL may also deteriorate when individuals lower down the chain of
command are subject to prosecution for the crime of aggression. There may be no threat of
prosecution for aggression before the ICC for those below the highest ranks, since the crime of
aggression is framed as a leadership crime.169 If, however, states parties incorporate the crime of
aggression into their domestic penal codes,170 as they have often done with respect to the other
161
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ICC crimes,171 national legislators may reformulate the definition of the crime to reach lowerlevel perpetrators, such as officers with operational or tactical command, 172 as opposed to those
with strategic command, or even foot soldiers. The rationale for prosecuting leaders for initiating
an act of aggression is not always easily contained to the highest leadership circle. 173 At a
minimum, if taken to its natural conclusion, and in keeping with the maxim ex injuria jus non
oritur (―a right cannot arise from a wrong‖), all officers and foot soldiers down the chain of
command could be stripped of the defense of combatant immunity174 for participating in an act
of aggression absent some theory that the rank and file were acting under duress or were nonculpable innocent agents entitled to assume they were fighting a lawful war. 175 Without the
promise of combatant immunity, combatants may lose tangible incentives to adhere to the jus in
bello,176 although may still comply for deontological reasons. IHL, perhaps more than any other
body of law, is based on carefully balanced privileges and responsibilities; remove a privilege
and the commitment to respect the corresponding prohibitions wanes.177
It remains to be seen whether states incorporate the crime of aggression into their penal
codes. The aggression amendments do not oblige states parties to do so. The final text contains
several important interpretive ―understandings‖ addressed to the customary international law
status of the definition of aggression adopted178 and denying any right or obligation on the part of
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 725 (Carston Stahn & Göran Sluiter, eds., 2009) (compiling
domestic statutes on aggression).
171
States are not strictly obliged to harmonize their domestic codes with the Rome Statute or to enable the exercise
of universal jurisdiction over ICC crimes. The only mandatory language in the Statute obliging states parties to enact
domestic legislation concerns state cooperation (Part 9) and the obligation to assert jurisdiction over offenses against
the administration of justice (Article 70(4)). There is preambular language recalling pre-existing obligations for all
states (not just states parties) to prosecute international crimes. In practice, however, many states parties have
amended their domestic law to mirror the ICC Statute in order to enjoy the privilege of complementarity. See
Coalition
for
an
International
Criminal
Court,
Implementation
of
the
Rome
Statute,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (compiling statutes).
172
Campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic objectives in theaters or operational areas are planned at the
operational level of war. Battles and engagements are planned and executed at the tactical level of war. The crime of
aggression, as it has been formulated within the ICC amendments, is prosecutable at the strategic level of war—that
echelon in which a nation‘s leadership deploys military resources to achieve strategic security objectives. See DEPT.
OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.
173
See generally David Rodin, Two Emerging Issues of the Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the Liability of
Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, in C. Stahn & J.K. Kleffner (eds): JUS POST-BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF
TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE 53, 61 (2008) (arguing that there are strong reasons to extend aggression
liability to ordinary line soldiers).
174
See Sharp, supra note ___ (arguing that the criminality of aggression should be extended beyond the senior
leadership of a state to encompass all of those persons who kill in furtherance of an illegal use of force).
175
Boister, supra note ___, at 443.
176
François Bugnion, Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT‘L REV. RED
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declared an outlaw by the mere fact of belonging to a State designated an aggressor. No amount of legal argument
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international law).
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defense to charges of aggravated trespass and criminal damage when the defendants attempted to disrupt activities at
British military bases to impede British involvement in the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). The defendants argued
that they were entitled to use reasonable force to prevent the commission of a crime (viz., the crime of aggression).
The House of Lords determined that although the crime of aggression existed under customary international law, no
31

states parties to incorporate the definition of aggression into their penal codes. 179 These
understandings may be instrumental in discouraging states from internalizing the crime of
aggression, drafting their own idiosyncratic definitions of the crime, or subjecting the crime to
expansive bases of jurisdiction, such as universal jurisdiction.180
F. The Two Sides of Deterrence
As is the goal of any penal prohibition, advocates for the crime of aggression hope that in
addition to dispensing retribution for past acts of violence, the existence of the crime of
aggression in the Rome Statute will contribute to the deterrence of future acts of aggression. The
theory is that the threat of prosecution and the assignment of individual criminal responsibility
will raise the cost of resorting to armed force in international relations, in a way that recourse
only to principles of state responsibility for breaches of the U.N. Charter‘s prohibition on the use
of force arguably has not. Needless to say, it would be a singular achievement if the crime of
aggression were able to reduce the incidence of conflict in the world and to make real the ―right
to peace‖ for which so many women (and men) yearn.181 And yet, the counter-fear exists that the
such crime existed in British law so the defense was unavailable. See Beth Van Schaack, Adjudicating Aggression in
Domestic
Courts,
INTLAWGRRLS,
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/04/adjudicating-aggression-indomestic.html.
179
These Understandings read:
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggression and the
crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments shall, in
accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation
to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State.
The United States in particular advocated for these provisions to emphasize that the amendments would be adopted
solely for the purpose of prosecutions under the Rome Statute and that there is a divergence of views among states
as to whether the definitions of ―crime of aggression‖ in Article 8-bis(1) and ―act of aggression‖ in Article 8-bis(2)
reflect statements of customary international law. The ultimate goal was to undermine any tendency to refer to these
definitions as evidence of the progressive development of customary international law and to signal that states are
not obliged to incorporate the crime of aggression into their domestic codes, or launch domestic prosecutions for the
crime, upon ratification or acceptance of the aggression amendments. The concern was that such prosecutions would
wreak havoc on the international scene were states to incorporate the definition of aggression in their domestic penal
codes and then indict world leaders in municipal courts, especially if based on expansive principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
See
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Understanding
Aggression,
INTLAWGRRLS,
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The Princeton Principles list crimes against the peace as among the international crimes subject to universal
jurisdiction. Article 2, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 29 (2001), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html. The commentary indicates that the issue was discussed at
length and that while many argued that the crime ―constitutes the most serious international crime, others
contend[ed] that defining the crime of ‗aggression‘ is in practice extremely difficult and divisive. In the end, ‗crimes
against the peace‘ were included, despite some disagreement, in part in order to recall the wording of Article 6(a) of
the Nuremberg Charter.‖ Id. at 47.
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See G.A. Res. 33/73, Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (Dec. 15, 1978); Philip Alston,
Peace as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 198 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H.
Weston, eds., 1980).
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codification of the crime of aggression, given that the text is broadly and ambiguously worded,
will over-deter some uses of force that may be beneficial to civilians and women in particular,
such as humanitarian interventions.
Though we are almost twenty years into the renaissance of the field, the deterrent effect
of international criminal law remains speculative.182 Although they will undoubtedly be highprofile, aggression cases may prove to be too episodic to exert a general deterrent effect in the
classical sense in which world leaders weigh the costs of injury against the perceived benefit of
the prohibited activities.183 Assuming the most robust enforcement, international criminal law
involves extreme conduct that is perhaps less susceptible to formal processes of deterrence. Even
the crime‘s most avid supporters likely do not anticipate that the crime will bring about a Kantian
perpetual peace.184 Yet, the threat of suit for the crime of aggression will undoubtedly register
some impact, especially on political leaders, who are concerned about preserving their political
viability domestically and abroad and are more likely to calculate the costs and benefits of a
particular course of action. 185 The reverberations generated by a single indictment against a
world leader for aggression may be enough to compel other governmental officials to think twice
before resorting to force. In the long run, the hope is that political elites will eventually
internalize more robust inhibitions against resorting to the use of force in their international
relations.186
The deterrent potential of the crime of aggression gives rise to a counter-fear that the new
provisions will over-deter and, in effect, chill lawful, beneficial, or otherwise legitimate uses of
force,187 such as: multilateral, regional,188 or unilateral peacekeeping missions and humanitarian
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international legal system).
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Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of „Humanitarian Intervention,‘ 93 AM. J. INT‘L L. 824, (1999) (arguing that
the Kosovo intervention was legitimate).
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interventions;189 rescue operations;190 or even military responses to acts of terrorism that might
incapacitate terrorist organizations and prevent future attacks. 191 The potential for overdeterrence stems from the fact that amendments to the Rome Statute do not include any express
exceptions for such uses of force. Although supporters of this definition tout its Resolution 3314
pedigree, the amendments to the Statute depart from that instrument in subtle yet significant
ways. Most importantly, Resolution 3314—and the U.N. Charter for that matter192—envision a
continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression. Indeed,
the Resolution‘s preamble states that ―aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the
illegal use of force.‖193 Article 8bis standing alone, by contrast, envisions that every violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as violations of a state‘s sovereignty, a concept left
undefined, constitute acts of aggression that may give rise to prosecution for the crime of
aggression. Uncertainties surrounding the definition of the crime, coupled with the checkerboard
jurisdictional regime and the concomitant unequal threat of prosecution among states, will no
doubt impede coalition-building, adherence to military alliances, and other multilateral responses
to global threats. States that have joined the aggression amendments may have different tolerance
levels for the degree of uncertainty inherent to the reach of the aggression amendments. This
difficulty in mobilizing joint action may paradoxically lead to more unilateral actions by states
not subject to the moderating effects of joint action.
1. Chilling Humanitarian Intervention
Whereas the concept of self-defense is well established under international law, the right
to use force in defense of others is less so. Advocates of an emerging, or surviving, norm in
favor of humanitarian intervention raise a host of inter-related arguments. One textual argument
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAGING WAR TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(June 1993), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/#2.
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cannot or will not protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human protection purposes,
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cases.‖); 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. A/RES/60/1, para. 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
(―Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
through appropriate and necessary means.‖); S.C. Res. 1674, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (―[The
Security Council] reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.‖). But see Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter
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attempts to carve out an implicit exception for humanitarian intervention from the language of
Article 2(4) of the Charter by noting that states engaging in humanitarian interventions do not
seek territorial aggrandizement or to undermine the target state‘s political independence—the
sovereign values protected by the Charter.194 Advocates also raise moral arguments drawing on
historical just war and natural law theory195 and argue that the post-WWII period ushered in a
new normative conception of sovereignty by which adherence to human rights values is now
constitutive of statehood,196 and a state that fails to respect these rights forfeits the right to enjoy
non-intervention.197 By this view, sovereign prerogatives of non-intervention and monopolistic
territorial power are contingent upon states manifesting respect for human rights. Advocates also
point to state practice (such as the 1999 Kosovo intervention) and opinio juris (such as the
Responsibility to Protect initiative198 and the African Union Charter199) to support an emerging
customary international law norm in favor of interventions on purely humanitarian grounds when
grave violations are at issue and other efforts (diplomacy, sanctions, etc.) have failed.
Nonetheless, the legality and desirability of humanitarian intervention remains contested,
and the aggression amendments have done little to clarify the law in this area. Indeed, even the
Kosovo intervention of 1999 (Operation ―Allied Force‖)—arguably the best example of a bona
fide, i.e. non-pretextual, humanitarian intervention—would at first glance meet all the elements
of the crime of aggression as they have been defined in Article 8bis. 200 Specifically, the
intervention was an air war consisting of an attack or bombardment by the armed forces of a
State against the territory of another State.201 Although NATO possessed no territorial ambitions,
the intervention did violate the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and, arguably, sought to
undermine the political independence of the state (if not ultimately effectuate regime change).
Most, although not all, scholars concede that the intervention was illegal under the Charter
framework. Many, however, concluded that it was nonetheless legitimate and justifiable under
the circumstances,202 as evidenced by the fact that it generated little in the way of overt censure
194
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from other members of the international community.203 At the same time, for that matter, the
intervention did not receive uniform praise. Many post-colonial states remain understandably
wary of endorsing a broad right of humanitarian intervention. The intervention was a ―manifest‖
violation of the Charter if measured by scale and consequences insofar as it wrecked
considerable damage on Yugoslavia; however, it was not necessarily an errant or flagrant
violation given lingering debates over its legality, morality, and wisdom.204
Delegates drafting the definition of aggression were not unaware of the potential conflict
between the contested doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the crime of aggression. Indeed,
the Kosovo intervention occurred just as the Preparatory Commission was starting its work on
issues left unfinished at the 1998 Rome Conference. Up until the discussions in Kampala,
delegates largely preferred to adopt a concerted silence on this point, so as to not jeopardize their
forward progress in defining aggression by getting bogged down in already intractable debates
over the legality or propriety of humanitarian intervention.
Nonetheless, in Kampala, the United States addressed the issue head on in connection
with its objections to the definition of the crime of aggression contained in Article 8bis. In prior
diplomatic meetings and again in Kampala, the United States made overtures to reconsider the
definition of aggression, but achieved little traction.205 Delegates were simply too invested in the
definition and its provenance to reopen the debate at such a late date. In the United States‘
second formal intervention in Kampala, Harold Hongju Koh, the Department of State Legal
Advisor, stated the United States‘ view that the definition itself was ―flawed,‖ and that the
apparent consensus on the definition of the crime might actually mask significant disagreements
over what types of conduct would constitute the crime of aggression. 206 At the same time, the
United States acknowledged that it might be possible to address these concerns without revisiting
the definition itself. 207 The United States thus focused on having key text inserted into the
amendment package at Annex III, which was slated to contain a number of other interpretive
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―understandings.‖208 The United States‘ proposed its understandings for a number of purposes: to
reshape the definition and its future interpretation, to tie the definition more closely to Resolution
3314 and to the U.N. Charter framework governing lawful uses of force, and to preserve an
opening for claims about the legality of humanitarian interventions and other arguably legitimate
yet potentially unlawful uses of force.209
One set of proposed understandings attempted to tether the definition of aggression and
its interpretation more closely to certain aspects of General Assembly resolution 3314. In
particular, the United States proposed threshold language to the effect that ―it is understood that,
consistent with the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 3314, only the most
serious and dangerous forms of illegal use of force are considered to constitute aggression‖210
and ―it is only a war of aggression that is a crime against international peace.‖ 211 As an
interpretive guide, the United States proposed language stating that ―it is understood that in
determining whether an act is manifest, all three components of character, gravity, and scale
must be sufficient to justify a ‗manifest‘ determination.‖212
With a second set of understandings, the United States sought to gain acknowledgement
that the U.N. Charter recognizes that certain uses of force remain lawful, notwithstanding Article
2(4) of the Charter. Accordingly, one proposed understanding read:
[N]othing in this resolution or the [aggression] amendments … should be
interpreted or applied in any manner inconsistent with General Assembly
resolution 3314, nor should they be construed as in any way enlarging or
diminishing the scope of the Charter of the United Nations, including its
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is unlawful.
More pointedly, another proposed understanding stated:
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered a
manifest violation of the United Nations Charter absent a showing that it was
undertaken without the consent of the relevant state, was not taken in self-defense,
and was not within any authorization provided by the United Nations Security
Council.
A third set of understandings attempted to carve out an exception for the doctrine of
208
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humanitarian intervention. First, the United States sought recognition of the fact that ―a
determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of all the
circumstances of each particular case, including the purposes for which force was used and the
gravity of the acts concerned or their consequences.‖ The reference to ―purposes‖ provided a
potential opening to argue for the legality of humanitarian interventions. Another proposed
understanding drew upon the definition of ―manifest‖ from the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 213 This proposed understanding was more explicit in addressing humanitarian
intervention:
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be
a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively
evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an effort
to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of
the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.
These proposals were repackaged into two draft understandings for consideration by
delegates in informal negotiations.214 The first proposal considered, Understanding X, combined
the reference to the most serious and dangerous uses of force and the need to consider all of the
circumstances including the purpose for which forces was used. Understanding X proved to be
controversial. In particular, a few states led by Iran argued that the introduction of the subjective
element of ―purpose‖ in considering the legality of uses of force threatened to compromise the
entire process and effectively amend the U.N. Charter by the back door. Detractors questioned
what purposes other than self-defense were lawful under the Charter. The United States at first
acceded to the removal of the term ―purpose,‖ but later reserved on the record the right to reopen the question of a more explicit mention of humanitarian intervention, although it did not
ever do so in a formal setting. Additional bilateral meetings were held, at which time consensus
was reached on Understanding X.215 The second, Understanding Y, mandated the cumulative
interpretation of the factors of character, gravity, and scale. Eventually, the two Understandings
appeared in the final text of the amendments216 as follows:
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the
illegal use of force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has
been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their
consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. …
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components
of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ―manifest‖
213
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determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the
manifest standard by itself.217
Together, the understandings make clear that any gravity determination applies at the time the
predicate act of aggression is under consideration, not just when the charges for the crime of
aggression are contemplated.
It remains to be seen whether and how the adopted understandings will influence
prosecutions before the Court in light of their uncertain legal authority.218 The proposed but unadopted understandings no doubt served some pedagogical purpose among delegations, but their
impact on the travaux préparatoires remains ambiguous. 219 Some delegations supported the
content or impulse behind the rejected understandings, but deemed them unnecessary or
superfluous; others expressed concerns as to their very content. Given this ambiguous record, it
will be for the various organs and constituencies of the ICC—including the prosecutor exercising
prosecutorial discretion—to determine whether to investigate future humanitarian
interventions.220 By virtue of this de facto delegation of interpretive authority, 221 the ICC is thus
poised to play a role as arbiter on the legality of humanitarian interventions. At a minimum, the
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equivocal record suggests that the Court should consider both potential meanings of
―manifest‖—seriousness and legal certainty—in the aggression context.222
One avenue for creating an opening for humanitarian interventions and other potentially
lawful or legitimate uses of force that was not fully explored would have been to tinker with the
mens rea element of the crime of aggression either with respect to the definition of the crime of
aggression or even the state act of aggression. 223 As it stands, the definition of the crime of
aggression contains an objective intention/knowledge formulation: the defendant must intend to
commit an enumerated act of aggression (bombardment, etc.) and must have knowledge of the
factual circumstances that render the act a manifest violation of the Charter. 224 The defendant
need not, however, have knowledge of legal doctrine concerning the use of force. If drafters in
Kampala had followed much of the Nuremberg jurisprudence 225 and required proof of a
heightened mental state—such as a specific intent or motive element to achieve an illegitimate
territorial acquisition or political aim or even require some showing of bad faith, malice,
willfulness, or hostile intent—they might have provided an additional element to enable the
Court to avoid entering into the humanitarian intervention fray and potentially altering the debate
through its jurisprudence.226 As an alternative to a mens rea element addressed to the defendant,
the amendments could have focused on the state‘s intent in engaging in the purported act of
aggression, bearing in mind the difficulty of attributing an ―intention‖ to an artificial entity like a
state.227 This was the impulse behind the United States‘ proposal to include reference to the state
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Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note ___, at 1193 n.55 (noting that any use of armed force giving rise to a
prosecution for the crime of aggression should be ―sufficiently serious‖ and ―its illegality [should be] reasonably
uncontroversial.‖).
223
See Elise Leclerc-Gagné & Michael Byers, A Question of Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT‘L L. 379 (2009).
224
See supra note ___.
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In the High Command Case, adjudicated pursuant to CCL 10, the tribunal stated that the lawful or unlawful
character of a war turns on its purpose: ―Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under
international law, is and can be determined only from a consideration of factors that entered into its initiation. In the
intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared, initiated, and waged is to be found its lawfulness or
unlawfulness.‖ Von Leeb, supra note __, at 486.
226
The issue of whether some element of specific hostile intent is inherent to the crime of aggression arose in
German legal proceedings in connection with the Kosovo intervention. The German Penal Code at Article 80
penalizes ―crimes against the peace‖ and states: ―Whoever prepares a war of aggression … in which the Federal
Republic of Germany is supposed to participate and thereby creates a danger of war for the Federal Republic of
Germany, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or for not less than ten years.‖ Criminal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) (Nov. 13, 1998) (Ger.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm. Claims
brought under these code sections to prevent Germany‘s participation in the Kosovo intervention were rejected on
the ground that the purpose of that intervention was to halt crimes against humanity, whereas those code sections
were concerned with the preservation of the peace. One commentator, later appointed a Judge of the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, noted:
Aggressive war was distinguished from a mere violation of the prohibition on the use of force by
the specific intent required, namely to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples. Thus, the
benign motives of NATO action were deemed to be sufficient to exculpate the German
government—an argument usually not sustained under German criminal law.
Andreas L. Paulus, Peace through Justice? The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time of Crisis, 50 WAYNE L.
REV. 1, 27 (2004).
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See Int‘l Crim. Ct., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Discussion Paper Proposed by the
Chairman, p. 3, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, (January 29–Feb. 1, 2007) (defining the threshold as follows: ―[An act]
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations . . .
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―purpose‖ in engaging in the impugned conduct. A prior but abandoned German proposal, for
example, would have defined an act of aggression with reference to a state policy‘s willfulness or
hostile intent. 228 In the alternative, the definition could have listed a series of prohibited
purposes, such as conquest, establishing a military occupation in the victim state, launching a
war of aggression, achieving the annexation of the other state‘s territory, acquiring the other
state‘s material resources, undermining the political independence of the state, ousting a state
leadership, or violating a state‘s neutrality.229
Another avenue to address these concerns would have been to rework the defenses to
more clearly allow for a consideration of whether the individual or state was motivated by the
defense of others at the time of the act of aggression. Although self-defense and the defense of
others appear in Article 31 of the Rome Statute,230 these articles do not easily accommodate
―defenses‖ that might be raised by the putative aggressor state at the stage in the proceedings at
which the state act of aggression is under consideration. Presumably, that the predicate state
action was in fact a lawful use of force could be raised by the defendant at trial pursuant to
Article 31(3), assuming the absence of conflicts of interest between the defendant and the
aggressor state government. It is unclear procedurally, however, whether either the impugned
state or the victim state would have standing to participate in the aggression determination by the
Pre-Trial Division absent amendment to the Statute or Rules of Procedure.231
As it stands, the only way for any party to address potentially unlawful but nonetheless
legitimate uses of force is with reference to the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale.
Drafters did not consider how these quantitative and qualitative factors should be defined or
applied, leaving it to the Court for interpretation. Both gravity and scale seem to refer to the
severity, magnitude, and consequences of a particular use of force. The term ―character,‖ as a
more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors and might provide an opening to
argue that an act of aggression was not committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.
This, of course, presumes that these arguments are not foreclosed by the rejection of the United
States‘ proposed understandings on humanitarian intervention.
such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military
occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.‖).
228
See, e.g., Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by Germany, UN
Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13 (July 30, 1999).
229
See, e.g., Appendix II, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (June 2006—ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1) (setting forth various proposals containing such purposes),
reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 141, 158, 160. See also Giogio Gaja, The Long Journey Toward
Repressing Aggression, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 427, 435-436 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds. 2002) (discussing German and Russian proposals pre-Rome to assert jurisdiction over wars of
aggression only).
230
See supra note __.
231
Delegates did not consider how the extant procedures governing the initiation of proprio motu investigations in
Article 15 will need to be adapted to the aggression determination by the Pre-Trial Division. Most importantly, as it
now stands, Article 15 does not give any participatory rights to states, although subsection 3 permits victims to make
representations, and subsection 2 invites the Prosecutor to seek additional information and testimony from states,
U.N. organs, non-governmental organizations, and other reliable sources in order to determine the ―seriousness‖ of
the information received. By contrast, states are entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article
19(2)(b), but only on complementarity grounds. The Article 15 process is designed to occur prior to the
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aggression determination.
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2. Intervening on Behalf of Women
For those of us concerned about augmenting international law‘s ability to protect women,
should we care about over-deterring humanitarian interventions and other uses of force that do
not rise to the level of an aggressive war or hostile attack? 232 Many strains of feminism are
closely tied to pacifism in rejecting the masculinist impulse to resort to arms in the face of
conflict. This approach is alternatively based on an affirmative essentialism or premised on
theories of differential socialization.—.233 Feminists may reject humanitarian intervention on the
ground that resorting to armed force may limit our ability to imagine, design, and implement
other non-violent forms of conflict resolution.234 There is also the symbolic concern that the idea
of humanitarian intervention furthers a victim narrative by portraying women as in need of a
male savior. While humanitarian interventions are ostensibly protective, they are—after all—
guarantees of more violence, at least in the short term if not longer. 235 Such operations still
valorize militarism and entail the use of armed force, which can cause great destruction, injure
civilians, and destroy societies.236 Doing so in the name of humanitarianism or women does not
negate the harm caused.237 All that said, anyone who is the innocent victim of violence deserves
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conflict situations.‖).
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See Peach, supra note ___ at 158-9 (critiquing just war theories as overly abstract by overlooking the inevitable
suffering and destruction that comes with any use of military force).
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Gardam, supra note ___, at 265 (noting that the use of force is the ―most overly destructive expression of the
power of the state‖).
237
The Kosovo intervention, for example, resulted in multiple incidents of ―collateral damage‖ that may have risen
to the level of war crimes. After a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor of the ICTY, Louise Arbour, ultimately
declined to launch a formal investigation into these incidents—a decision that was not without controversy. See
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf
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Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 503 (2001) (criticizing
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to be rescued from her predicament, and encouraging women to exercise their autonomy and
agency is simply folly when they are looking down the barrel of a gun. 238 Given these
considerations, it is unlikely that feminist thinkers will ever universally come to terms with the
idea of a just war.239
Notwithstanding this ambivalence, many feminists have fought for a more robust
intervention in previous conflict zones where women were at risk.240 These calls began anew
when the Taliban began imposing a form of gender apartheid 241 in Afghanistan.242 It was not
until the attacks of September 11th, however, that the United States mobilized an intervention in
Afghanistan, which was accused of harboring elements of Al Qaida. At that time, the rhetoric
surrounding the intervention appropriated feminist concerns about the plight of women under the
target government in the service of garnering the support of domestic and international
constituencies for the military response. 243 Never, however, has the substantial denial of
women‘s rights—whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural—served as the sole or
primary basis for a humanitarian intervention.244 To be sure, situations in which interventions
doubt power politics also impacted her decision, as prosecutions would not have been politically feasible, given the
Tribunal‘s Security Council provenance.
238
See Engle, supra note ___ at 217-224 (discussing debates among human rights organizations and feminists about
the need to intervene militarily in the face of atrocities).
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Foundations Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid: Intersections of Feminism and Imperialism in the United States,
available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dasgupta/RussoFMF.pdf (arguing that the Feminist Majority Foundation was
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See Faiza Hirji, The War for Women‟s Freedom: Orientalist Imaginaries of Rescue in Afghanistan (2005),
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/1/4/7/9/p14796_index.html (arguing
that the rhetoric surrounding the Afghanistan war portrayed Afghan women as in need of salvation to render the
intervention more palatable to Western eyes); Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women‟s Rights In The „War On Terrorism,‘
9 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL‘Y 211 (2002). The plight of women has also been employed to justify keeping
troops in Afghanistan. See Aryn Baker, What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan, TIME (Aug. 9, 2010). The
magazine has been criticized for cynically using violence against women as propaganda in support of the continued
engagement in Afghanistan and presenting a falsely dichotomous dilemma—women remain safe if the foreign
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(July
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2010),
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have been launched or considered involved violations of women‘s rights that might have been
alleviated with a halt to violence or a change of regime.245 That said, interventions that did go
forward have not necessarily benefited women across the board. 246 Given this history, it is
difficult to support a feminist vision of humanitarian intervention on behalf of women under
contemporary conditions, when women are so often excluded from decisions about uses of
force. 247 Humanitarian intervention may be more palatable to feminists, and ultimately more
beneficial to women, were women included in their design and implementation.248
G. Ending Conflicts
In addition to enabling the prosecution of the architects of acts of aggression, the crime of
aggression may serve another useful purpose in providing a crime for which amnesties could be
strategically offered to exact peace from warring parties and to encourage leaders to order their
subordinates to lay down their arms. 249 Specifically, promising top leaders amnesty from
potential prosecution for the crime of aggression may provide a carrot for peace talks and
negotiations,250 assuming of course these individuals are not at risk of being prosecuted for other
atrocity crimes within the Court‘s jurisdiction. In this way, the ability to charge potential
defendants for the crime of aggression may reduce conflict not via deterrence, but more
indirectly as a tool for negotiators once conflict has already begun. All civilians will benefit if
such amnesties can shorten armed conflicts.
Although controversial, amnesties have proved to be useful in effectuating processes of
245
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transitional justice in formerly repressive regimes251 and in demobilizing rebels in the context of
non-international armed conflicts.252 As a condition of relinquishing power, the government of
General Augusto Pinochet, for example, granted its agents an amnesty in 1978 for any acts
committed by government agents in Chile and abroad. 253 Likewise, the amnesty-for-truth
tradeoff was central to the negotiated solution in South Africa that enabled the dismantling of
apartheid. 254 Many human rights organizations oppose the use of amnesties for grave human
rights violations under the majority of circumstances, arguing that they further impunity and
undercut domestic and international efforts to deter gross violations of human rights.255 Most, but
not all,256 domestic courts that have reviewed their own amnesties have upheld their legality.257
By contrast, all human rights bodies 258 and international criminal tribunals 259 have ruled that
amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide violate fundamental principles of
justice, including the right of victims to access to justice and truth before a court of law. In
addition, other states and international tribunals are not obliged to respect amnesties awarded by
domestic authorities.260
251
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As it stands, amnesties for the core atrocity crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes—are generally considered unlawful under international law 261 and thus are
foreclosed as an international negotiating tactic. Most studies on the legality of amnesties do not
include the crime of aggression within the list of non-amnestiable crimes,262 suggesting that this
may be one ICC crime for which an amnesty might be employed by international negotiators and
upheld by the ICC. Of course, this view reflects the fact that aggression has not been criminally
charged since World War II. This apparent opinio juris may change once the crime becomes
prosecutable before the ICC.
H. Distractions and Detractions
Human rights groups, 263 international criminal law personnel, 264 government
representatives, 265 and academics266 have raised concerns that adding the crime of aggression at
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eve of the Review Conference, this group argued:
[A]sking the ICC to take on another category of crime at present risks overburdening the Court
when it is still striving to prosecute and try those responsible for current crimes. Much work is
needed to further improve the operation of the Rome Statute system in respect of cooperation,
complementarity, the impact on victims and affected communities, and questions of peace and
justice. ... Prudently declining to adopt an amendment on aggression at this time, when the Court
has such urgent challenges to tackle, is the most effective way to strengthen an institution that is
central to combating impunity, and ensuring accountability, for the most heinous international
crimes.‖
Open Society Institute Cautions Against ICC Review Taking on Aggression (May 10, 2010),
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this early stage in the Court‘s life will detract time and attention from the atrocity crimes, which
routinely go unpunished both domestically and internationally and which more directly address
gender-based violence. Many groups fear the Court will become bogged down in trying to
understand the causes of war—inquiries deemed outside the Court‘s current institutional
competency267—rather than in prosecuting war‘s consequences. Indeed, the crimes against the
peace charge was the linchpin of the Nuremberg and Tokyo indictments and the centerpiece of
the final judgments. Notwithstanding the enormity of the Holocaust, the majority of the
Nuremberg judgment is devoted to condemning the aggressive acts of Germany—including the
invasions of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Belgium—in violation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, various bilateral treaties and assurances of non-aggression, and declarations of neutrality.268
Likewise, the crimes against humanity and war crimes allegations at Tokyo received short shrift
in the Tokyo judgment, leading to the invisibility of many crimes committed against civilians in
general and women in particular.269
Although the Court has made important advances to date (especially in flushing out its
procedural framework), it does not yet have much to show for its eight years of existence. There
are, as of yet, no verdicts on the merits. The trials of only three of the six defendants in custody
are ongoing, but troubled. Only a handful of defendants are in custody while others flout their
arrest warrants. Indeed, none of the Ugandan defendants is in custody despite the fact that these
were the first indictments issued. 270 Further, an indictment was not confirmed in one of the
Sudanese cases,271 the high level defendants are at large, the African Union came out against the
indictment of Al Bashir272 (although it has been suggested that Libya hijacked the proceedings
that generated the preliminary policy statement273), and aid groups find it difficult to reach those
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in need in Darfur. The indictments themselves are of more limited scope than comparable
indictments before the ad hoc tribunals, 274 although almost all are commendable for their
integration of charges of gender-based violence.275 This fear that the inclusion of the crime of
aggression in its Statute will distract the Court is especially real given that the Assembly of
States Parties has allocated no additional resources to the Court to prosecute this new,
controversial, and qualitatively different crime. Arguably, to effectively prosecute the crime of
aggression, the various organs of the Court will need to hire staff with appropriate experience
and skill sets to evaluate aggression referrals and evidence. Depending on how often the Court
faces aggression claims, it may also be necessary to alter the mix of judges to include more
experts in public international law at the expense of experts in criminal law and procedure,
human rights, humanitarian law (the jus in bello), or violence against women and children.276
In addition to overwhelming the Court, investigating and prosecuting the crime of
aggression may further politicize the institution, undermining its ability to undertake its core
mandate. 277 One fear is that states will use their referral powers opportunistically to trigger
investigations into inter-state grievances over territory, foreign policies, arms control, the drug
trade, secessionist movements, and the like.278 The risk that states parties will manipulate the
Court for their own ends is perhaps more acute now that delegates have decided not to allow an
exclusive Security Council filter for state referral cases and to instead empower the Pre-Trial
Division to approve aggression charges in the event of Security Council inaction. 279 Even if
indictments do not issue or the Court rejects the charges, the risk of destabilization is everpresent.280
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The Council‘s five permanent members—Great Britain, China, France, Russia and the
United States—and some of their close allies had favored a system that allowed the Security
Council to serve as a gatekeeper to any prosecution for aggression. Detractors had worried that
such an arrangement would undermine judicial independence, render the Court a tool for the
Security Council, and lead to unequal justice.281 At the same time, the Council might have been
in a better position than the Pre-Trial Division to ferret out abusive or fallacious claims that are
more likely to exacerbate international tensions than alleviate them. Indeed, externalizing the
filter process to the Council may have actually decreased actual or potential politicization by
allowing the Court to focus on the attribution of individual criminal liability rather than inserting
it into political disputes that may give rise to the perception of bias.
V.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding this hyper-visibility in the post-WWII period, crimes against the peace
all but disappeared from the international criminal law pantheon in the Cold War period. The
international community is now poised to recommit to prosecuting the crime, thus completing
the Nuremberg legacy and fully adapting the Nuremberg Principles to the modern era.282 If we
care about what happens to women in war, we should do everything in our power to decrease the
incidence of war in the first place. It is too early to tell whether the inclusion of the crime of
aggression in the Rome Statute will be able to do this. Indeed, this Article has reached no firm
conclusion on how feminists should think about whether the newly codified crime of aggression
will improve the lives of women. Both the definition of the crime and the jurisdictional regime
contain elements that may be helpful, neutral, or even harmful to the interests of women.
Certainly prosecuting the crime of aggression is not the only, or even best, way to
decrease inter-state violence. But, it is the path that the international community is now on.283
Once again, we find ourselves asking the ―woman question‖ in a reactive posture 284 and
engaging in a continuing task of determining how legal doctrines and frameworks—which
women played little hand in generating—affect women. Although at this early stage I am left
holding contradictory thoughts about the utility of codifying the crime of aggression, at a
minimum, a number of pitfalls to incorporating the aggression amendments into the Rome
Statute are already visible. These should be kept on the forefront of our minds and conversations
as this crime is operationalized and a procedural regime is developed for its prosecution. Since
this is a path that the international community is on, we should endeavor to make sure it goes in
the right direction. Moreover, we should not lose sight of alternative solutions to ending violence
as we imagine a more peaceful world. The world‘s women deserve nothing less.
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